BOP ACCOUNT from the 'ATLANTICO'
[Reference: Dade County Police OCB file #153-D]
CI 153-D
DATE: May 1, 1961
TO: THOMAS J. KELLY, Metropolitan Sheriff
FROM: LT. FRANK KAPPEL, Supervisor Criminal Intelligence
SUBJECT: CUBAN COUNTER - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES - Additional Information
On April 26, 1961, Agent A. L. TARABOCHIA was contacted by a very reliable
informant who revealed that he had just returned from the abortive invasion
in Bahia de Cochinos on April 17, 1961.
The informant stated that he had taken part in the invasion as coxswain
of a landing craft attached to the transport, "Atlantico".
In preparation to the landing, the informant and his group were transferred
from the training camp of Trax, Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua.
The group was commanded by ENRIQUE TOMEO who was assisted by an American
instructor known as DOC. The group, comprising eight men and eight boats,
remained in training for approximately 30 days.
Puerto Cabezas is located on the Eastern coast of Nicaragua and has no communications
with the interior except by air and telephone. It is the opinion of
the informant that although the location was ideal as a secret embarkation
point, it lost its secret value when the troop transports waited at anchor
in the bay for three days after loading the troops. The informant added
that while all the means of communications were controlled by the government,
nothing could prevent a Communist from leaving on foot and contacting a foreign
embassy in Managua revealing thus the impending invasion.
The informant revealed also that the training camps in Guatemala were not
shrouded in the secrecy that was alleged to surround them because there were
Guatemalan civilians working as laborers by day and returning to their homes
at night. Opposition by Guatemalan communists and Castro sympathizers
was strong and culminated with the ambush of a truck enroute from Trax to
Rethaluleu. The truck with a few recruits was blown up by dynamite as
it rounded a curve on the mountain road.
The training at the camps was conducted by American instructors of the highest
caliber. According to the informant, the performance of the instructors
as individuals and their professional preparation were instrumental in forming
a lasting bond between the troops in training and their instructors.
This accounted for the high morale of the troops who, even after the abortive
invasion, declared themselves ready to return to action as soon as possible.
At this point, it should be pointed out that even after capture, the majority
of the invading troops showed their fighting spirit whenever the opportunity
arose. It is a matter of record that on April 26, 1961 during a televised
interrogation of the captives, FIDEL CASTRO was forced to warn the spectators
that applause was forbidden during the interviews. This measure was
adopted after the prisoners, herded into the Havana Sports Palace, gave a
prolonged applause to a captured invader being interviewed before TV cameras
by FIDEL CASTRO. The prisoner contradicted some of the dictator's statements
about the motives that had prompted the captives to join the invading forces.
The informant revealed that the 81 mm mortar instructor could hit a 55 gallon
drum used as target with the second salvo. In most cases, the instructors
accompanied the troops as far as feasible and in some cases, as with the frogmen,
they actually led their men to their objectives.
According to the informant, there were several miscalculations which led
to the unsuccessful conclusion of the invasion.
First, there was the unjustified delay of departure from Puerto Cabezas
and the sudden vacating of the camps. Both operations could have
been carried out in a more secretive way by transferring men and equipment
piece meal to a rendezvous point and staging area in some uninhabited island
of the Caribbean. The seasoned troops in the camps could have been replaced
with recruits in order to avoid immediate knowledge of a sudden departure.
The informant added that the complete convoy came in full view of Guano
Island in the late afternoon of April 16, 1961. Guano Island is used
by the Cuban Government as a weather station and has a radio station in operation.
Since approximately nine hours elapsed from the time the convoy came in
view of Guano Island and the time the landing began, there is good reason
to believe that the weather station on the Island reported the strength and
direction of the convoy because it is most unusual for such a number of ships
to travel together in close proximity of the Cuban coast.
This apparent lack of secrecy prompted the captain of the ship, a Spaniard
named MARURI, to ask if the island had been taken by the Anti-Castro forces.
The informant states that the landing took place according to schedule but
almost from the beginning, the invaders ran into considerable opposition from
the militia. The landing of a party of frogmen which was to establish
the landing beaches was discovered by a patrol of militiamen. The leader
of the party had to kill the members of the patrol and this exchange of fire
resulted in alerting the rest of the positions along the coast.
The landing operations began at approximately 5 a.m. after the initial opposition
had been subdued. The troops landed singing the Cuban National Anthem
and until daylight, the operations progressed satisfactorily.
The landing operations were somewhat hampered because of another instance
of bad judgment when tanks, trucks, and other heavy equipment were landed
before the infantry. The infantry men in turn landed with a little more
than their weapons and necessary ammunition to carry them over until the
rest of the material could be unloaded from the ships.
The informant revealed that the day before the landing, ROBERTO SAN ROMAN,
Commander of the heavy weapons battalion, had stated during a briefing session
that the Castro Air Force had been obliterated and posed no threat.
SAN ROMAN added that the operation was going to be mainly a landing by the
Brigade and no popular uprising was expected, at least at the initial stages.
The unexpected arrival of Castro's Air Force on the scene created a situation
that soon became unbearable for the ships. Although the ships tried
to offer as much support as they could to the troops that had landed, their
effectiveness was hampered by the lack of weapons. The only armament
the transports had consisted of four .50 caliber machine guns. After
two ships were badly damaged and abandoned, the escorting destroyers gave
orders to withdraw out of range of the coastal batteries.
The consensus of the returned expedition members was that it was a lack
of adequate air support that doomed the invasion. The Castro Air Force,
consisting of three Sea Furies and four B-26's, had the advantage of greater
range and greater speed and maneuverability of the Sea Furies as opposed to
the air support of the invaders consisting only of B-26's.
The sinking of the communications vessel and that of the transport carrying
the fuel and ammunition for the tanks rendered the position of the troops
that had landed almost desperate. The Captain of the U.S. destroyer
code named "Santiago" asked an aircraft carrier cruising in the proximity
for air support; back came the reply, "My heart is with you but I cannot do
anything else".
The fighting continued until mid-afternoon of April 18, 1961 when the transports
received orders to return to Puerto Cabezas. One of the reasons for
such action was the fact that the transports were overloaded with high octane
fuel and explosives and an approach to the coast could mean sure destruction.
The informant added that every one of the returned invaders was willing
and ready to return and felt positive that with sufficient air cover, the
operation could have been successful.
After a two day stopover in Puerto Cabezas, the evacuees left by air and
arrived at Homestead Air Force Base at approximately 11 p.m. of April 24,
1961. Mr. FRANK BENDER'S Assistant, BARKER, was on hand to receive the
returning personnel.
In order to underline the poor judgment of the organizers of the invasion,
the informant cited an incident that created deep resentment among the troops.
Just prior to departure from Puerto Cabezas appeared aboard the transport,
"Lake Charles" Comm. JESUS BLANCO, Chief of BATISTA'S infamous S.I.N. (Naval
Intelligence Service). BLANCO'S presence not only offended those present
but resulted in what could be termed mutiny when BLANCO demanded command of
the ship. A compromise was reached and BLANCO was relegated to command
the artillery (four .50 caliber machine guns) of the vessel. BLANCO
did not disembark in Cuba but returned to Miami along with the rest of the
evacuees.
The chronological succession of the military operations will be summarized
in a report to follow.
Respectfully submitted,
A.L. TARABOCHIA
Intelligence Agent
LT. FRANK KAPPEL, Supervisor
Criminal Intelligence
ALT/rew
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