BOP ACCOUNT from
the
'ATLANTICO'
[Reference: Dade County Police
OCB file #153-D]
CI 153-D
DATE: May 1, 1961
TO: THOMAS J. KELLY, Metropolitan Sheriff
FROM: LT. FRANK KAPPEL, Supervisor Criminal
Intelligence
SUBJECT: CUBAN COUNTER - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES -
Additional Information
On April 26, 1961, Agent A. L. TARABOCHIA was contacted by a
very reliable informant who revealed that he had just
returned from the abortive invasion in Bahia de Cochinos on
April 17, 1961.
The informant stated that he had taken part in the invasion
as coxswain
of a landing craft attached to the transport, "Atlantico".
In preparation to the landing, the informant and his group
were transferred from the training camp of Trax, Guatemala
to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua.
The group was commanded by ENRIQUE TOMEO who was assisted by
an American instructor known as DOC. The group, comprising
eight men and eight boats, remained in training for
approximately 30 days.
Puerto Cabezas is located on the Eastern coast of Nicaragua
and has no communications with the interior except by air
and telephone. It is the opinion of the informant that
although the location was ideal as a secret embarkation
point, it lost its secret value when the troop transports
waited at anchor in the bay for three days after loading the
troops. The informant added that while all the means
of communications were controlled by the government, nothing
could prevent a Communist from leaving on foot and
contacting a foreign embassy in Managua revealing thus the
impending invasion.
The informant revealed also that the training camps in
Guatemala were not shrouded in the secrecy that was alleged
to surround them because there were Guatemalan civilians
working as laborers by day and returning to their homes at
night. Opposition by Guatemalan communists and Castro
sympathizers was strong and culminated with the ambush of a
truck enroute from Trax to Rethaluleu. The truck with
a few recruits was blown up by dynamite as
it rounded a curve on the mountain road.
The training at the camps was conducted by American
instructors of the highest caliber. According to the
informant, the performance of the instructors as individuals
and their professional preparation were instrumental in
forming a lasting bond between the troops in training and
their instructors. This accounted for the high morale
of the troops who, even after the abortive invasion,
declared themselves ready to return to action as soon as
possible.
At this point, it should be pointed out that even after
capture, the majority of the invading troops showed their
fighting spirit whenever the opportunity arose. It is
a matter of record that on April 26, 1961 during a televised
interrogation of the captives, FIDEL CASTRO was forced to
warn the spectators that applause was forbidden during the
interviews. This measure was adopted after the
prisoners, herded into the Havana Sports Palace, gave a
prolonged applause to a captured invader being interviewed
before TV cameras by FIDEL CASTRO. The prisoner contradicted
some of the dictator's statements about the motives that had
prompted the captives to join the invading forces.
The informant revealed that the 81 mm mortar instructor
could hit a 55 gallon drum used as target with the second
salvo. In most cases, the instructors accompanied the
troops as far as feasible and in some cases, as with the
frogmen,
they actually led their men to their objectives.
According to the informant, there were several
miscalculations which led to the unsuccessful conclusion of
the invasion.
First, there was the unjustified delay of departure from
Puerto Cabezas
and the sudden vacating of the camps. Both
operations could have been carried out in a more secretive
way by transferring men and equipment piece meal to a
rendezvous point and staging area in some uninhabited island
of the Caribbean. The seasoned troops in the camps
could have been replaced
with recruits in order to avoid immediate knowledge of a
sudden departure.
The informant added that the complete convoy came in full
view of Guano
Island in the late afternoon of April 16, 1961. Guano
Island is used
by the Cuban Government as a weather station and has a radio
station in operation.
Since approximately nine hours elapsed from the time the
convoy came in
view of Guano Island and the time the landing began, there
is good reason
to believe that the weather station on the Island reported
the strength and
direction of the convoy because it is most unusual for such
a number of ships
to travel together in close proximity of the Cuban coast.
This apparent lack of secrecy prompted the captain of the
ship, a Spaniard named MARURI, to ask if the island had been
taken by the Anti-Castro forces.
The informant states that the landing took place according
to schedule but almost from the beginning, the invaders ran
into considerable opposition from
the militia. The landing of a party of frogmen which
was to establish the landing beaches was discovered by a
patrol of militiamen. The leader of the party had to
kill the members of the patrol and this exchange of fire
resulted in alerting the rest of the positions along the
coast.
The landing operations began at approximately 5 a.m. after
the initial opposition had been subdued. The troops
landed singing the Cuban National Anthem and until daylight,
the operations progressed satisfactorily.
The landing operations were somewhat hampered because of
another instance of bad judgment when tanks, trucks, and
other heavy equipment were landed before the infantry.
The infantry men in turn landed with a little more
than their weapons and necessary ammunition to carry them
over until the
rest of the material could be unloaded from the ships.
The informant revealed that the day before the landing,
ROBERTO SAN ROMAN, Commander of the heavy weapons battalion,
had stated during a briefing session that the Castro Air
Force had been obliterated and posed no threat. SAN
ROMAN added that the operation was going to be mainly a
landing by the Brigade and no popular uprising was expected,
at least at the initial stages.
The unexpected arrival of Castro's Air Force on the scene
created a situation that soon became unbearable for the
ships. Although the ships tried to offer as much
support as they could to the troops that had landed, their
effectiveness was hampered by the lack of weapons. The
only armament the transports had consisted of four .50
caliber machine guns. After two ships were badly
damaged and abandoned, the escorting destroyers gave orders
to withdraw out of range of the coastal batteries.
The consensus of the returned expedition members was that it
was a lack
of adequate air support that doomed the invasion. The
Castro Air Force, consisting of three Sea Furies and four
B-26's, had the advantage of greater range and greater speed
and maneuverability of the Sea Furies as opposed to
the air support of the invaders consisting only of B-26's.
The sinking of the communications vessel and that of the
transport carrying the fuel and ammunition for the tanks
rendered the position of the troops that had landed almost
desperate. The Captain of the U.S. destroyer code
named "Santiago" asked an aircraft carrier cruising in the
proximity for air support; back came the reply, "My heart is
with you but I cannot do
anything else".
The fighting continued until mid-afternoon of April 18, 1961
when the transports received orders to return to Puerto
Cabezas. One of the reasons for such action was the
fact that the transports were overloaded with high octane
fuel and explosives and an approach to the coast could mean
sure destruction.
The informant added that every one of the returned invaders
was willing
and ready to return and felt positive that with sufficient
air cover, the
operation could have been successful.
After a two day stopover in Puerto Cabezas, the evacuees
left by air and arrived at Homestead Air Force Base at
approximately 11 p.m. of April 24, 1961. Mr. FRANK
BENDER'S Assistant, BARKER, was on hand to receive the
returning personnel.
In order to underline the poor judgment of the organizers of
the invasion, the informant cited an incident that created
deep resentment among the troops. Just prior to
departure from Puerto Cabezas appeared aboard the transport,
"Lake Charles" Comm. JESUS BLANCO, Chief of BATISTA'S
infamous S.I.N. (Naval Intelligence Service). BLANCO'S
presence not only offended those present but resulted in
what could be termed mutiny when BLANCO demanded command of
the ship. A compromise was reached and BLANCO was
relegated to command the artillery (four .50 caliber machine
guns) of the vessel. BLANCO did not disembark in Cuba
but returned to Miami along with the rest of the evacuees.
The chronological succession of the military operations will
be summarized in a report to follow.
Respectfully submitted,
A.L. TARABOCHIA
Intelligence Agent
LT. FRANK KAPPEL, Supervisor
Criminal Intelligence
ALT/rew
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