BOP INVASION
FIRST HAND
ACCOUNT
MAY 1961
[Reference: Dade County OCB
file #153-D]
CI 153-D
DATE: May 29, 1961
TO: THOMAS J. KELLY, Metropolitan Sheriff
FROM: LT. FRANK KAPPEL, Supervisor, Criminal Intelligence
SUBJECT: CUBAN COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES -
Additional Information - ULISES CARBO
Reference is made to the report under the same case number
dated May 21,
1961 in which the initial contact with the delegation of ten
Cuban prisoners
was related. The prisoners arrived in Miami on May 20,
1961 to negotiate
an offer made by FIDEL CASTRO to exchange the captured
invaders of Bahia
de Cochinos for 500 tractors.
The leader of the group, ULISES CARBO, a personal
acquaintance of the writer,
related several episodes of the invasion in addition to
information concerning
the treatment of the captives by the Communist regime of
Cuba.
ULISES CARBO was aboard the transport "Houston" when the
invasion force sailed
from Puerto Cabezas toward the Bahia de Cochinos landing
beaches. Just
prior to departure, the ranking officers aboard the
transport had a strong
argument with a C.I.A. agent known as "Jerry" about the
feasibility and need
for anti aircraft protection. As a result, eight .50
caliber machine
guns were installed on the "Houston". The "Houston"
was the slowest
vessel in the convoy, her speed being only eight
knots. This caused
an earlier departure from Puerto Cabezas and by consequence
a longer stay
at sea.
The "Houston" was carried two battalions plus fuel and
ammunition.
The troops were supposed to be transferred to waiting
L.C.I.'s which, in
turn, would land them to the selected beach.
When the transport reached the rendezvous point at the inner
tip of the Bay
of Cochinos, the L.C.I.'s failed to materialize and
consequently t he troops
had to be landed by outboard launches which were to be used
only for beach
patrol duty.
At approximately 2 a.m. when the "Houston" approached the
objective, it became
necessary to lower the patrol launches and lifeboats to land
the troops.
In contrast with orders of strict silence to be observed by
the troops, the
lowering of the boats was a noisy operation. It is the
opinion of CARBO
that the militiamen ashore were alerted by the noise of the
steam operated
davits when they put the small boats overboard. CARBO
related an incident
of a man who dropped a clip on deck and was immediately
placed under arrest
while almost immediately afterwards, the noisy davits were
put in operation.
As a consequence of the lack of appropriate landing means,
the disembarking
of the personnel, which was originally planned to take only
one and one and
a half hours, took such a long time to accomplish, that at
daylight only
half of the personnel had reached shore.
With daylight the "Houston" came under constant attack by
enemy aircraft.
As a consequence all landing operations had to be halted
after an attempt
to land a party of eight men ended with the death of five as
the strafing
aircraft singled the small craft for target.
The "Houston" was escorted by the "Barbara J" which,
according to CARBO,
had four United States officers aboard. These officers
were observed
manning the anti aircraft guns of the vessel and drew the
admiration of the
Cubans for their courage.
At approximately 8:00 a.m., a Seafury launched two rockets
against the "Houston"
that completely disabled the transport which had already
suffered damages
in the ruder during a previous attack. Since there was
no possibility
of repairing the two large holes amidships produced by the
rockets, Captain
LUIS MORSE DELGADO decided to proceed toward land and beach
the ship.
ULISES CARBO related an incident that left him and his
companions astonished
and bitter at the unaccountable behavior of the crew of the
"Barbara J"
When the "Houston" was disabled by the direct hit several
men jumped overboard
an began swimming toward the "Barbara J" which was standing
by.
For some unexplainable reason the "Barbara J" instead of
picking up the survivors,
revved up her engines and began moving toward the opposite
direction.
This action caused such a resentment among the men left on
the "Houston"
that they opened fire against the "Barbara J".
CARBO added that when the transport ran around approximately
800 meters (½
mile) from shore, it had just reached the limit of its
endurance because
it sank with only a few feet of superstructure remaining
above water.
Through the hole on her side, the "Houston" lost a large
quantity of oil
which rendered more difficult the evacuation of the ship.
The two lifeboats, capable of carrying 30 men each, were
used to land the
non swimmers, while the personnel capable of swimming,
covered the distance
as best as it could under constant strafing by the CASTRO
aircraft.
ULISES CARBO revealed that he had to shed his boots and
pants to facilitate
his movements and thus he reached shore in his underwear.
From the time he landed until captured ten days later,
ULISES CARBO had very
little to eat and drink with the exception of grub worms,
crabs, and roots
all eaten raw to prevent detention.
CARBO related that the morale of the invaders was very high
and, contrary
to CASTRO'S claims, several hundred militiamen surrendered
during the initial
phases of the invasion.
Episodes of heroism were common but in some instances, there
were acts that
were outstanding. According to CARBO, a tank manned by
the invaders
engaged in combat with a Stalin-type enemy tank. When
its ammunition
was exhausted, it charged against its opponent and pushed it
out of the road
into the swamp where it sank in the mud.
On another instance, 17 men with a few bazookas and two
mortars placed on
the highway linking San Blas to the interior held at bay an
estimated five
to six thousand militiamen for two days.
CARBO also related that one of the high ranking officers
committed an act
of cowardice that earned him the name of "Sabana blanca"
(white sheet) because
he was one of the first to surrender and used a white sheet
to attract attention.
CARBO did not reveal his name.
CARBO revealed that during the peak of the air attacks, he
overheard the
frantic appeals for air support by the Captain of the United
States D.D.
"Santiago". In one of the verbal exchanges the Captain is
desperation exclaimed,
"The State Department is full of shit". When the
Captain of a nearby
carrier replied that he could not order his plane to support
the desperate
invaders because of express orders from the Department of
State.
CARBO added that United States planes were observed flying
overhead at a
high altitude towards the end of the first day and observed
a delta wing-type
aircraft peel off from a group of three and open fire on
some distant objective.
This is the only alleged intervention by a United States
aircraft reported
so far by participants in the invasion.
CARBO stated that the invaders managed to penetrate as far
as 30 miles inland
but after the second day the lack of ammunition and food
became so acute
that there was no other alternative but to surrender or try
to escape towards
the Escambray Mountains.
The CASTRO forces, which towards the end of the fighting had
reached an estimated
strength of 61,000, began gaining terrain only after the
third day and after
the ammunition had been exhausted.
The writer was able to establish, after a perusal of a Cuban
magazine relating
the CASTRO version of the operations, that only a dozen of
mortar shells
were captured with the equipment which appeared in
photographs published
by the magazine.
CARBO revealed that he received fair treatment at the hands
of his captors
and added that during his meanderings in the swamps, he and
three companions
came in contact with several patrols of militiamen.
Although the enemy
was superior in number and armament, it was also very
restive in engaging
the small haggard group armed with only a .30 caliber
machine gun and three
belts of ammunition.
The group of prisoners arrived in Miami related an episode
of genocide perpetrated
by the CASTRO forces that equals in cruelty similar acts
performed by Nazi
exterminators during World War II.
A group of the first prisoners to be captured, totaling 152
was packed in
a refrigerator trailer for the trip to Havana. There
was no ventilation
in the insulated van and soon the heat and the lack of air
rendered the situation
unbearable. One of the prisoners managed to open a
hole with the aid
of a crucifix allowing thus a small group to take turns in
breathing fresh
air. No amount of pounding on the sides of the van
resulted in improving
the captive's conditions since they were escorted by a
hardened communist,
Captain OSMANI CIENFUEGOS, Minister of Public Works and
brother of CAMILO
CIENFUEGOS who disappeared on October 28, 1959, allegedly
killed on CASTRO'S
orders.
At the end of the 90 mile trip, nine prisoners were found
dead by asphyxiation.
Five of them were identified as follows: RENE SILVA, PEPE
MILLAN, PEPE VILLARELLO,
CUCO CERVANTES, and JOSE IGNACIO MACIA. RENE SILVA is
a cousin of ULISES
CARBO who asked that this incident be kept from the press
until the negotiations
for the tractors were ended.
CARBO revealed that he underwent a 4 ½ hour interrogation by
FIDEL
CASTRO who was extremely polite and at one point revealed
that his side had
deployed no less than 49 battalions of an estimated strength
of 50,000 men.
According to CASTRO, 80,000 mortar and 50,000 cannon shells
were expended
during the battle. CASTRO called the invaders fools
for opposing such
a superior force as long as they did.
One of the prisoners in the group, a Negro named ELOY FELIX
PEREZ TAMAYO,
when told by CASTRO during a television interrogatory that
Negroes in Cuba
could swim in the same beaches with whites replied, "I did
not come to fight
in Cuba because I wanted to go swimming".
CARBO revealed that just prior to departure, the group was
taken to a 3 ½
hour tour of Havana and shown the accomplishments of the
communist regime.
At the end of the tour, CASTRO personally took the group
into a restaurant
an ordered that they be served food and beer without
limitations. Obviously
this was meant to convince the prisoners about to embark for
Miami that there
was no food shortage in Havana.
Many of the prisoners revealed that the women employs of the
Social Welfare
who came in contact with them slipped rosaries in their
hands and expressed
their sympathy. Many of the militia guards serve as
contacts with the
outside and CARBO revealed that he had means of
communicating with Miami
when necessary.
At approximately 7:25 a.m., May 27, 1961 the ten prisoners
returned to Havana
on P.A.A. flight 421. They expressed confidence that
their negotiations
would bring about the proposed exchange of prisoners.
Respectfully submitted,
A.L. TARABOCHIA
Intelligence Agent
LT. FRANK KAPPEL, Supervisor
Criminal Intelligence
ALT /rcw
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