History of Terrorism
Dade County - Miami,
Florida 1979
[REFERENCE:
Needs Assessment Study,
Terrorism in Dade County, Florida, Grant
#78-TA-AX-0006. Final Report
by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc.
July 1979,
Chapter Three]
A SHORT HISTORY OF TERRORISM
IN DADE-MIAMI
Writing a short history of anything is always a most
challenging
task. The significant adjective is an injunction to be
brief, but
the question is always, what to omit? Writing history
is a
revealing of the past, a bringing to light of things that
have been
forgotten, or the calling into prominence of things, the
significance
of which was not appreciated in their time. This
historian is in
an advantageous position, in some ways, for he is able to
review
matters with a completeness and detachment that was not
possible for
those who lived through the events. Yet, withal, the
historian's
work is only a reconstruction, lacking the life and
vividness of the
real happenings he seeks to depict. He is, after all,
only the
interpreter of his sources and the imperative "Be brief!"
enjoins on
him a selectivity authorized only by his own good
judgment.
It is all too easy for the most diligent historian, with all
the time
and space necessary for completeness, to do violence to the
Truth. He who engages to write a short history will
almost
certainly fall into error. This must not be regarded
as a fatal
deterrent. Proper consideration of the problems posed
by this
study demands a history; there is neither time not space for
an
extended one. What follows, with all its faults, must
suffice for
the purpose. T he first dilemma, as always, is where
to
begin? Nowhere does terrorism have a neat, precisely
documented
beginning. Even the most seemingly authoritative
statements can
be misleading. The Staff Report of the Subcommittee on
Civil and
Constitutional Rights states: "Terrorism is not new.
It can be
traced to an ancient Arab group, the Society of Assassins,
and the
French Revolution's ‘Reign of Terror'". Some six
hundred years
separate these two unconnected matters. While
terrorism may not
be traceable with such pristine certainty, the authority on
which part
of this statement rests can. Professor Bernard Lewis,
in his book
The Assassins (1968) wrote: "In one respect, the Assassins
are without
precedent - in the planned systematic and long-term use of
terror as a
political weapon...they may well be the first
terrorists".
Brevity, therefore, has its price. Categorical
statements of this
kind must always be viewed with suspicion.
It is simply not possible to say when terrorism in Dade
County began;
probably there has been some terrorism as defined in this
study, ever
since the County was extensively settled. What is
certain is that
it did not become a community or a law enforcement problem
of any
magnitude until comparatively recently. Terrorism in
South
Florida generally, and Dade County in particular, whether of
the
politically inspired or non-politically inspired variety, is
historically tied in a very direct way to relations with the
island of
Cuba. Although Dade-Miami has enjoyed a constant
interchange with
other neighboring Caribbean peoples, notably those of the
Bahamas, it
is Cuba that has left its deepest impress upon this portion
of the
mainland, and has so radically altered its culture and
outlook on
life. From the start, the reasons have been
overwhelmingly
political. The island is very close to the continental
United
States, well within small boat range. From the
time of the
liberation of the island, as a consequence of the
Spanish-American war,
the military and political interests of the United States
have been
evident, and only the good faith of President Theodore
Roosevelt stood
in the way of an outright annexation of the island.
Even today,
as the United States plans its withdrawal from the Canal
Zone of
Panama, it maintains a naval base at Guantanamo on this
otherwise
communist-held island. Cuba has always been a vibrant,
progressive island by comparison with its neighbors.
But for all
the brightness and liveliness of its people, its infectious
rhythms and
Caribbean setting, Cuba in the 1950's was a backward
country, raddled
by corruption and vice, and in the grip of a cruel
dictatorship.
The tourist drawn by the bright lights and t he good life of
Havana saw
little of this and cared even less. Organized crime
had a strong
hold on the island's vice and American business an equally
firm grip on
its fragile economy. Not even a fervent patriotism, a
strong
communist party, and the makings of effective labor
organization seemed
likely to disturb that. Yet resistance to Batista
grew, both at
home and abroad, and Dade County began to experience,
without realizing
it, a foretaste of what was to come. There was
plotting and
gun-running, and much traveling to and from the
island. Miami was
a logical jumping-off point for any operations against the
regime then
in power, and a convenient place to return to for R & R
when a
period of revitalization was necessary, or when things
simply became
too hot. Then, at the end of the Eisenhower years,
there appeared
a young man called Fidel Castro who was destined, among
other things to
change the way of life of Dade Count forever.
Fidel Castro has been in the public eye for a long
while. He has
rarely shunned publicity; indeed, at times, he has actively
courted
it. Still he remains, in many respects, an enigma; the
definitive
biography of Fidel Castro has still to be written. For
those
Americans who had as little stomach for Fulgencio Batista as
their
counterparts today have for Anastasio Somoza, the sudden
advent of this
loquacious, energetic mountain fighter, permanently dressed
in
fatigues, did not seem a bad thing. From what was
known of him,
he did not seem noticeably anti-American and there was some
evidence,
at least, that he might comfortably adjust to living within
the United
States' sphere of influence. His opponents, meanwhile
temporarily
defeated, had crawled off to South Florida for what most
felt certain
would be a very short stay before the next round, which was
sure to go
in their favor. By mid-1959, there began a definite
leftward
drift on the part of Castro, disconcerting and confusing to
many in
charge of United States' policy, and frankly alarming to
many Cubans
who had either remained helpfully neutral or were even
actively siding
with the new regime up to that point. A steady stream
of Cuban
refugees began to join those already in Dade County.
It is
interesting to review the progression of that
migration. The
rich, the intellectuals, the opposition politicians came
first; they
had long enjoyed close ties with South Florida. Then,
after a
while, came the middle classes. And finally, as the
floodgates
opened, the small entrepreneur and on down to the lowest
strata of t he
community. Castro was not long in crossing his
Rubicon. In
1960, he expropriated American businesses and, with little
economic
alternative, cast himself firmly into the Soviet camp.
This was
enough to show the United States where it really stood, and
the huge
exodus of refugees was enthusiastically welcomed into South
Florida as
an earnest of the United States' intentions to topple the
Castro
regime, restore American business to its former glory, and
to send
these grateful Cuban citizens back victorious to their
homeland.
There is no need here to catalogue the miscalculations and
disasters
that prevented those good intentions from bearing the
desired
fruit. Much money and energy was expended in
organizing to that
end and the fugitive Cuban community that by 1962 had grown
to over
150,000 could hardly complain at that time that it had been
betrayed or
that the United States was half-hearted in the execution of
its
trust. As late as December, 1962, President Kennedy
welcoming
back the 1,113 Bay of Pigs prisoners exchanged for
$30,000,000 worth of
medical supplies could promise to return them their battle
flag in a
"Free Havana". The battle lines were clearly drawn,
and only the
Soviet Union and the threat of World War III stood between
Castro and
the fulfillment of that promise. That it was never
fulfilled,
cost not only a great deal in the United States prestige and
security;
it conferred permanent residence status upon what was to
swell to an
alien community of over half a million in South Florida,
nearly all of
whom came to settle in Dade County.
The transition from a small, visiting contingent, grateful
for shelter,
but eager to recover its homeland, to a dispossessed people
condemned
to perpetual exile was not easy to make. The period of
transition
was not abrupt, and there were encouraging signs that the
United
States, in the first years, had not lost its resolve.
Castro was
everywhere depicted as the enemy; any dealings with him - or
even
visits to him - were regarded as treasonable by official
U.S.A., just
as, on different grounds they were so considered by the
Cuban exile
community. More to the point, the United States was
lending
considerable covert aid to the exiles in their efforts to
organize
themselves into a military force capable of fighting its way
back into
power. Hundreds of United States case officers
"managed" their
Cuban charges, who were taught the rudiments (and sometimes
more) of
the skills it was felt they would require to win back their
island
home. This was an exciting, if not very productive,
time.
Enthusiasm ran high and the Cubans were convinced that they
had a real
prospect of military and political victory. Although
no state of
war existed between the United States and Cuba, the legal
niceties of
the Neutrality Act and other provisions prohibiting the
raising or
training of foreign forces on United States' soil in time of
peace were
discreetly ignored. Few had cause to question either
the
rightness of what they were doing or the interests in which
they were
doing it. This is not the place to examine or stand in
judgment
upon the adequacy of what was then done or even, with
hindsight, to
evaluate the prospects for success. Two observations
must,
however, be made, as they have a bearing on the subsequent
turn of
events. The United States never really created an
effective army
in exile. Of Cuban bravery and military capacity,
there can be no
doubt. It was simply never organized into an effective
fighting
machine. Either Castro's real strength was hopelessly
misjudged -
a simple, but not uncommon, intelligence failure - or those
engaged
about the direction of the business were ambivalent from the
start. The second point is perhaps even more
serious. The
anti-Castro movement lacked any real leadership that might
have given
it cohesion and led to recognition of a government in
exile.
There were many leaders, but no one leader, who might have
given the
movement a real cohesiveness and purpose. Once the
general
disillusionment set in, both these facts made the absorbtion
of the
Cuban exile population by the South Florida area a much
easier and less
painful task that it would other wise have been. The
Cubans
brought many things with them to the United States including
a
distinctive culture and a burning hope for return.
What they did
not bring was an organized political structure that was
going to carry
over the "old ways" in a fashion likely to conflict with the
democracy
into which they were being slowly and almost imperceptibly
absorbed. The result, once the United States had
effectively
withdrawn from a fight for which it had shown so little
enthusiasm in
the first place, was a period of drift. Some of the
brave but
unrealistic soldiers came back again and again to tilt
Quixote-like at
the Windmill. This became an exercise in ego-building
rather than
a purposeful, military one. A structure of "fighters
in exile"
began to emerge but, because of the hopelessness of the
struggle, it
had no accompanying political ethos out of which a nation in
exile, a
real political entity could coalesce. The bulk of the
community
slowly and painfully adjusted to the reality of a new life
in an alien
land. And a new, and more realistic "politics" grew
gradually out
of this adjustment.
It is difficult to explain, in a few words, how a
large, alien
community came so successfully and completely to take over,
so
peacefully, a large chunk of desirable United States
territory.
The success can, perhaps, be best explained by claiming this
result as
a happy accident. Because it was never intended, it
happened in a
way that aroused no opposition or even awareness of the
process by
which it occurred. The Cuban community itself was too
numbed, too
disappointed at its loss to be evincing interests in
conquest
elsewhere. Although it clearly did not happen
overnight, the
South Florida community has, as it were, only just awakened
to the fact
that two major cities in Dade County, Miami and Hialeah,
have more than
50 percent of Cuban residents in their populations.
Overall, the
Latin population of Dade County is about 33 percent and
rising.
The real "Cuban problem" for the area is only just
beginning, and the
Dade County Cubans - these new, permanent residents of the
United
States - are going to have to contribute substantially to
finding some
of the answers that will be required. All of this is
directly
material to the terrorist problem in Dade County; not only
that which
is already a part of history, but that which is yet to
present itself
in the future. New leaders, new politics are emerging
to engage
the new social problems that arise out of acquisition and
integration
rather than dispossession and the desperate maintenance of a
separate,
national identity. This is a painful, somewhat
unnatural
process. Once that all-sustaining hate is removed,
what is there
to rush in and fill the vacuum? A community that
builds too long
on its xenophobia grows up warped, with an inbuilt
propensity for
social conflict. The case of Northern Ireland is very
much a
point. In particular, the changing needs of the
community that
the new politics must serve will assuredly give rise to
something that
has, superficially at least, been largely absent
hitherto. The
unique nature of the struggle against Fidel Castro gave the
Cuban
community in exile the appearance and form of a one-party
state.
That "party" was intensely conservative, even
reactionary. Of
necessity, that one party was opposed to communism in any
shape or
form. It could not tolerate even the suggestion of
"fellow
travelers". The defense of its very being as an entity
depended
upon it. Freed from that yoke of necessity, the "new"
politics
will be able to develop its own right, left, and
center. There
will be painful moments while it does so, but do so it must,
if the
chronic deformation that has stunted the growth and social
happiness of
Ulster is to be avoided in Dade County. This has
profound
implications for the future of terrorism in Dade County, for
some of
the basic assumptions about whether a certain kind of
politically
inspired terrorism, left-wing terrorism in a broad sense,
can or might
flourish in a community that has been traditionally
antagonistic
towards it will be severely challenged.
Some other pertinent observations concerning the character
of this
"invasion" lie within the discretion of the historian
touching upon the
present subject. The high concentration of Cubans in
the South
Florida area is, itself, the product of accidental
circumstances rather
than design; or perhaps, with hindsight, the product of a
miscalculation on the part of the social engineers of the
time.
After their initial reception into the United States, it was
assumed
that these political refugees, like so many others in the
past, would
disperse throughout the United States and would be absorbed
and
integrated into comparatively distant population
centers. This
simply did not take place, and any move in that direction
was soon
reversed. These were a Caribbean people, whose
affinity for the
sun and the sea, from which many had garnered a living, was
met by the
climate and topography of Dade County more perfectly than
any other
place to which they might have migrated. Besides it
was the
closest point to their beloved homeland, a convenient place
for the
return that virtually all confidently expected.
Moreover, South
Florida and its people were good to these "visitors" and
there were
none of the acute problems of housing, employment, and
racial tensions
that might have been anticipated in the areas to which they
had been
notionally assigned. The population growth and its
implications
for the area, ethnically, culturally, and linguistically,
were simply
not foreseen. By and large, these exiles were a
likeable
people. They were industrious, respectful of certain
important
American values, and, above all, commitedly
anti-communist. What
was less apparent, at the start, was that this was not only
a community
in a strange sort of limbo; it was also a community
hermetically sealed
from any real interaction with the native community into
which it had
been transplanted. That community, relatively small
and
easy-going, watched these strange happenings somewhat
bemused but with
little real concern. After all, it never anticipated
having to
live with the problem in perpetuity. The Cuban
community seemed
to ask for comparatively little and its troubles,
internally, were
largely its own. It neither sought publicity for them
nor shared
them with outsiders. All Americans really needed to
know about
these people, so it seemed, was t hat they were against
Castro - and
that had commended itself strongly to the governments of the
day.
It was with something of a shock, therefore, that the other
residents
of Dade County woke up one day in 1973 to the fact that they
were now,
by ordinance, a bilingual community. This may seem, at
first
sight, to have very little to do with terrorism. In
reality, it
has a great deal to do with the perceptions of terrorism in
this
community.
There has been very little assimilation by the original
community of
this strange human burden imposed upon it by force of
circumstances. Rather, the Cuban community has grown
and
developed on its own to the point where, cuckoo-like, it is
forcing the
native fledgling from the nest. For many of those who
have
witnessed, at first hand, these developments over the years,
the Cuban
community remains as mysterious and incomprehensible as when
it came;
only now it is larger, more obvious, more powerful - and
clearly here
to stay. This mystery was not merely the result of
linguistic, or
even a cultural barrier. It was more that there was
really little
to share of interest to the majority of the "old"
community. The
curious, complicated politics in which the Cubans seemed to
indulge,
their pathological hatred of Castro and his regime and
everything that
went with being a Cuban in exile, were just too much for the
outsider
to grasp - unless some special motive existed for making a
study of
these things. It is quite likely that, until some sort
of
homeostasis was reached, the two communities could have
grown up
harmoniously, side by side, without ever having a greater
understanding
of each other's ways - had it not been for the
violence. This,
and the way in which it was portrayed and perceived, were
what really
brought the Cuban community under scrutiny by those who had
so
unconcernedly allowed it to grow up in their midst.
Had the
Cubans brought with them an unusually high rate of common
crime, or
even a reputation for hot-blooded "Latin" violence, it is
unlikely that
this would have caused such concern. It could have
been more
readily explained and, perhaps, understood in terms of
America's
overall, horrendous crime problem. But this violence
was
"political" and was related to a politics that was both
foreign and
disconcerting. Moreover, it began to manifest itself
at a
troubled time in United States' history, at a time when
self-examination was already beginning to turn to
self-doubt.
Talk of terrorism, world-wide, was already hanging heavy in
the
air. The American role in Vietnam was being seriously
- and often
violently - questioned at home. And the purposes and
methods of
many American agencies, most notably the CIA, were being
vigorously
probed and "exposed" by the growingly vociferous "New
Left". The
"received" image of Castro for the larger population of the
United
States - all, that is, save the Cuban exiles - began subtly
to
shift. Castro's achievements, in education, social
security,
anti-corruption and the like, began to be touted, gaining
ready
acceptance in a population that had already embarked upon a
most
extraordinary process of self-flagellation. This left
the Cuban
exile community in a somewhat incongruous position, namely
that of
maintaining its undying opposition to the Cuban Communist
leader from a
sanctuary that was coming, increasingly, to perceive him in
a more and
more favorable light. While part of that community
remained
confused and mainly anxious to bury the past - though not
without grief
- and get on with the business of living, others hardened
their resolve
and vowed to continue the unequal fight even though they had
to do so
alone.
This history of these events can be divided into a number of
convenient, if arbitrary, periods. The first period,
during the
presidency of John F. Kennedy, had seen the arming and
training of
large numbers of Cuban exiles by the United States for what
was to be a
serious military assault to retake the island and overthrow
the newly
established Castro regime. The apt terrain of South
Florida began
to take on some of the appearance of an armed camp as
thousands of the
exiles were trained in skills ranging from the rudimentary
to the quite
sophisticated that it was hoped would serve them in their
various
tasks. In the present context, too much ought not to
be made of
the training by the United States defense forces and the CIA
of this
"Secret Army". Certain romantic notions always cling
to such
episodes and are purveyed to a public, avid for adventure,
and, in the
main, not too well informed about what such work is really
all about,
in a way calculated to excite and exaggerate the destructive
potential
of such a force. While some covert specialists, with
extraordinary skills, are selected and trained for
operations of this
kind, the majority (who had no special qualifications to
commend them
for the purpose beyond their nationality and enthusiasm)
were given a
training little different from that received by many
inducted into the
United States' forces at that time, and in some ways less
intensive or
comprehensive. The United States was not producing, as
is
sometimes suggested by those given to such hyperbole, a
"race of
super-terrorists" who, once the employment for which they
had been
trained had failed to materialize, would turn upon the
community at
large with their newly acquired skills. Naturally, the
skills
taught had an anti-social, domestic use to which they could
be
put. But the same argument could be extended with
equal accuracy
to all those who served with the United States forces, for
example, in
Vietnam - and the hidden slur would be just as great.
The United
States was training soldiers to fight an irregular war with
the skills
necessary to wage such a struggle. It certainly was
not training
"terrorists" as such, nor endowing those whom it trained
with terrorist
attitudes and philosophies. These facts should be
borne in mind
because, due to the climate of the times and certain,
occasional
journalistic license, they have achieved a prominence and
significance
beyond what they might properly bear. The failure of
the Bay of
Pigs operation and the death of President Kennedy imposed a
severe
check on these developments, but did not signal the end of
the
period. United States sponsored raids on Cuba
continued well into
the period of the Johnson presidency, but the writing was
already on
the wall. While the Cuban community was beginning its
slow and
painful readjustment to political reality, many of these
"surrogates"
for the United States in its "war" with Castro were having
to start to
rethink their own position.
The first thought for many - as it is so often in such
circumstances -
was to carry on the fight alone. The words of one who
had trained
and fought alongside these exiles in earlier times, give a
good picture
of the situation: "Without U.S. support, however, we were
virtually
powerless to conduct any cohesive, meaningful action.
Government
agencies, including the F.B.I., the coast Guard, and Border
Patrol and
various Florida law enforcement departments had tightened
their
surveillance of exile activities, thus adding immensely to
the
difficulties of mounting clandestine military
operations. In the
absence of the stabilizing, unifying influence of the
Kennedy's and the
CIA in Cuban affairs, dissension prevailed among various
exile
political and paramilitary organizations." (Bradley E.
Ayers,
"And They were the Pros, Part II", Soldier of Fortune,
March,
1978). What happened next was a logical development
for those
who, on any appraisal of their own position could
only, in
relation to t heir adversary now victorious on so many
fronts,
including the United Nations, consider themselves as the
"Weak".
Again, the words of the same writer take up the story: "It
was in this
atmosphere of discontent and seething frustration in the
Miami Cuban
community that a handful of highly trained exiles turned to
violence on
their own. They were labeled as militants, at first,
then called
radicals. Now they are referred to as international
terrorists". The Years of Disillusionment for the
Cuban exile
militants carried many portents for the future of United
States' policy
generally, and the change in the United states' world
role. The
1965 intervention in Santo Domingo, while constituting an
important and
necessary check to Castro in the Caribbean, alienated
support for the
United States in much of Central and South America; these
countries
were but slowly recovering from the shock of John Kennedy's
death,
which affected them very greatly on an emotional
plane. Serious
terrorism outbreaks were occurring in Columbia and
Argentina, while
Peru and Bolivia both faced a serious problem of insurgency
in the
interior. Much of this activity was being actively
fostered by
Fidel Castro, and this CIA trained "Secret Army" had, for
some of its
members at least, the prospects of useful employment
elsewhere.
But, for most, the noble fight was over; if they continued
alone, as
many vowed, it was without the official blessing of the
United States
and with eve na stern hint at suppression. This latter
seemed to
be directed at denying United States soil and, in
particular, South
Florida, to the exiles as a staging ground or launching
point for
attacks on Cuba that were already attracting international
criticism. Relatively overt, paramilitary operations
being no
longer possible, these "militants" turned to terrorism, much
of it of a
symbolic or expressive nature. Virtually all of this
was planned
and prepared in Dade County, but many of the most
significant
operations were undertaken elsewhere, some of them overseas.
The year 1968 saw a significant upswing in the violent
activities of
these Cubans exiles who, by now, were beginning to be
identified by the
evocative names they had assigned themselves. This was
a
significant year for political violence on many
fronts. In the
United States, the anti-war protest was at its height and
campuses from
Berkeley to Columbia University burned (in some cases
literally) with
radical fervor. Students took to the streets in London
and Rome,
and the mighty Charles de Gaulle was nearly toppled by a
student/workers coalition. A mishandled protest gave
rise to the
formidable West German terrorist movement. Martin
Luther King and
Robert Kennedy were assassinated and the decision of
President Johnson
not to run for re-election paved the way for Richard Nixon
to the White
House. By comparison with these and other portentous
events
occurring elsewhere on the world stage, the efforts by the
Cuban exiles
to keep their case before the public were puny indeed.
Reviewing
the numerous bombings, in Dade County and elsewhere, as well
as attacks
on shipping in coastal waters, during the period 1968-1972,
one is
struck not only by its lack of coherence, but also by its
overall
ineffectiveness. The devices used, their half-hearted
employment
lack seriousness when set in their wider historical
context. This
was a time of terrorist "spectaculars". Skyjacking was
at its
height; the PLO and PFLP were trying to take the world by
storm; and
the IRA had begun a savage, deadly campaign in Northern
Ireland and the
U.K. Little, if anything the Cubans did, or attempted
to do,
could compare with all this, but it is natural that, in a
climate of
heightened awareness about terrorism and its potentiality
that some of
this concern should have rubbed off on this "alien"outgrowth
of this
new community in the United States. El Poder Cubano
had, on a
dispassionate evaluation, little more than symbolic or
nuisance value,
but it alarmed many by its actions in many parts of the
United States,
and served to keep the exile cause alive if not in very good
shape. Perhaps its most spectacular and effective
exploit, the
shelling of a Polish freighter in the Port of Miami was
overly
ambitious and what let to the temporary abatement of the
incipient
terrorism in the form in which it then presented
itself. A
pediatrician-turned-terrorist, Dr. Orlando Bosch Avila, was
convicted
of this, and it is material note of history that the
American elections
of 1968 were coming up, and the federal government was, at
that time,
in a much stronger position to take the necessary measures
against
these groups than it was subsequently; J. Edgar Hoover was
still
Director of the F.B.I. During this time, there was
much talk and
comparatively little action among Cuban exile groups for it
is evident
that little agreement existed among the proliferation of
comparatively
short lived associations. This is, incidentally,
characteristic
of politics in Latin America generally, only one party,
APRA, being
able to claim anything like a solid history of continuity
over many
years. Castro agents were active, too, creating fear
and
dissension, and there did not exist that climate of trust
and purpose
in which effective counter revolutionary action against
Castro might
have been developed. These groups were united only by
their
pathological hatred of Castro and a fierce determination to
regain
possession of their island. They had no political
philosophy in
common, running the spectrum from extreme right-wing, not
unfairly
characterized as fascist in the strict sense, to those
inclining
towards the position of liberal democrats. There was
plenty of
room for ideological and personal disagreement, and petty
jealousy, and
great opportunity for Castro to engage in tactics of divide
and conquer.
In 1970, there occurred an event far from the center of
these
activities that was to have a profound effect upon their
subsequent
development. Politics in Chile had been swinging
steadily
leftward for more than a decade and only massive
intervention by the
Chilean Right, covertly assisted by various United States
interests,
public and private, had frustrated a constitutional
take-over of power
by the coalition of communists led by Salvador
Allende. Allende
finally triumphed through the ballot, and the prospects of
another Cuba
in mainland South America seemed very strong indeed.
Moreover,
the Peruvian military government that had seized power in
October,
1968, was noticeably left-leaning and, unlike any of its
predecessors,
was making overtures to the new government of Chile that
could have had
far-reaching developments for the security of the
hemisphere.
Advisers" from Castro's Cuba were already pouring into the
area and an
all-out offensive on American business and other interests
seemed.
Imminent. The Cuban exiles took on a new lease of
life.
Suddenly, their aspirations once again matched the value of
their
skills. In 1972, with the Allende government already
heading
towards deep trouble, Dr. Bosch disappeared from Miami in
violation of
his parole. A significant link with Chilean Rightists,
themselves, at that moment in the political wilderness, was
already in
the course of being forged. While these events did not
give the
Cuban exile movement the real cohesion that it needed to
become an
effective political force in the fight against Castro, it
did provide
it with the fuel necessary to propel it along the road
towards an
expanded campaign of terrorism. With the overthrow of
the Allende
regime, the new Chilean government of Augusto Pinochet found
itself in
the eye of an international storm whipped up by left-wing
elements
everywhere. It came, in 1973, when the Nixon
administration was
under severe pressure over Watergate, and the American
public had
embarked upon that extensive process of soul-searching that
was not
only to reveal all sorts of "wrong-doing" on the part of
government
agencies at home and abroad, but to end in a severe cramping
of law
enforcement styles and capabilities. Into all this,
the
rejuvenated militant Cuban exiles leaped with
enthusiasm. The
Cuban exile terrorist movement, aided now by an "official"
Chile,
anxious to improve its image abroad and get rid of its
enemies at the
same time, embarked on an ambitious program of
expansion. The
time was no more opportune than it had ever been, but hatred
of Castro
was still strong and ingrained in the main Cuban exile
population and
the means were now being provided by a sponsor; the Cuban
exiles were -
albeit in their own interest - surrogates once more.
In the
extensive campaign of terrorism promoted by the Cuban exiles
from 1973
onwards, there is no evidence of direct Chilean
participation in
anything undertaken in Dade County. This is only to be
expected,
for the Chileans were using the Cubans who needed only
encouragement
and material support. This period spawned a variety of
groups
with imposing sounding titles and rejuvenated others.
Some had
imposing charters and tables of organization. The
identities of
many of these "militants", acting in one way or another,
became a
matter of public knowledge. An air of excitement is
clearly
apparent, on any view of the materials relating to the times
-
especially 1973- 1975, and those participating in these
activities, in
the planning and preparation phase, clearly expected a
dramatic
intensification and widening of the struggle. It seems
that the
broad intention was to attack selected Cubans, especially
those in some
way connected with government, in various places around the
world. In addition, the property of those engaged in
commercial
and other relations was to be the subject of this
offensive. The
overall objective seems to have been to demonstrate the
vulnerability
of the Castro government. It cannot have been expected
that these
offensive demonstrations would result only in mild protest
from
Castro. Clearly, it has to be anticipated that Castro
would
retaliate - and he only logical target for that retaliation
would have
been the large exile community lodged in Dade County.
It is a
standard terrorist tactic the world over to provoke
retaliation from
the opponent, usually the government against which the
struggle is
waged. The retaliation falls, inevitably, on the
innocent who, it
is theorized, can then be subjected to intensive propaganda
designed to
mobilize their fears and anger and marshal these against the
enemy. That such retaliation did not take place can be
attributed
either to the lack of concern displayed by Castro and his
contempt for
these unworthy opponents, or to his own excellent
understanding of the
principles of terrorism as a weapon of war. Whatever
the case, in
this regard Castro simply did not rise to the bait.
In fact, Castro seems - whatever he might have been doing
behind the
scenes - to have treated most of these attacks with a lofty,
statesmanlike disdain. However he may have felt on a
personal
level, he allowed nothing to stand in the way of his steady
progress
towards normalization of relations with the United
States. The
dependency of Cuba on the Soviet Union should never be
underestimated. Whatever else Castro may be, he is
certainly a
realist. While correctly appraising Cuba's value to
the Soviet
Union, he is under no illusions about how little leverage,
in a
political sense, he really has. Unlike so many other
client
states, Cuba cannot play off the great powers one against
the
other. Cuba must - for all her seeming independence in
foreign
affairs - dance to the Russian tune. It has to be
assumed that
Castro was acting in this matter, as in others, to the
orders of his
Russian masters in accordance with their overall
strategy. The
bombings, the attacks on shipping, the threatened and actual
kidnapings
and assassinations brought indignant rhetoric and diplomatic
denunciation, but no reprisals that might have occasioned a
rupture in
the softening of the United States' position with regard to
improving
relations with Cuba. Castro was clearly determined to
play a
waiting game while these interesting "negotiations" with the
United
States were in the balance. T he resignation of
President Nixon
in August, 1974, does not seem to have had any marked effect
on the
resolve of the Cuban exile militants to continue their
campaign.
As long as a Republican administration remained in office,
they could
be reasonably assured that they would nor be too vigorously
pursued for
the unyielding hard line they were committed to taking
against
Castro. Moreover, Castro himself now seemed to be
taking a
somewhat different line and had commenced, in secret, the
expansionist
policy of former years. Now, (doubtless, again under
instructions
from Moscow), Castro began secretly dispatching troops to
Angola in
breach of a tacit understanding to the contrary that had
been reached
with the United States. In that same year, 1975, Cuban
exiles
began stepping up their offensive against selected outside
of the
United States and there seemed to be clear indications that
these
activities were being directed by Dr. Orlando Bosch Arvila,
now a
fugitive from federal justice. Dr. Bosch who was
traveling
extensively in Central America, the Caribbean, and Venezuela
on a
Chilean passport appeared to be directing or coordinating
these
activities through Accion Cubana, a Successor to El Poder
Cubano.
In June of the following year, an attempt was made to unify
the
movement against Castro and to give it some of the
cohesiveness it had
earlier lacked. As a consequence, a group known as
Coordinacion
de Organizaciones Revolucionarias Unidas (CORU) was formed
following a
meeting in the Dominican Republic. This had the effect
of
creating something in the nature of an ad hoc "general
staff"and was
needed for the greatly increased activity that was now
anticipated as a
result of this "pooling" of resources. However patient
and
forbearing Castro might have felt up to this point, and
however
disinclined to take his opponents seriously in their
increasingly
vigorous attacks upon his interests, he was shortly to be
presented
with a terroristic episode of unprecedented magnitude and
ferocity that
he could not afford to ignore. On October 6, 1976, a
Cuban
airliner plunged into the sea off Trinidad killing all
seventy-three
persons aboard. A bomb had been placed aboard the
aircraft,
evidently in the checked luggage. This was terrorism
of a totally
different kind, and many in the Cuban community who had
secretly
admired and, in their own various way, supported the brave
"freedom
fighters" must have found it difficult to suppress a shudder
at the
thought of the innocent victims hurled to their deaths in
this
way. Such acts are easy to rationalize for the
fanatic; but those
less committed have an understandable difficulty with
them. This
act, which brought bitter denunciation from Castro and an
evident
resolve to do something about the matter, led to the arrest
of Dr.
Bosch and three accomplices by the Venezuelan
authorities. They
remain, for the moment, in prison in Venezuela awaiting the
determination of their situation by the relatively unhurried
processes
of Venezuelan criminal justice. This act of
international
terrorism may be regarded as the watershed of the Cuban
exile
movement's campaign to date.
From 1974 onwards, a series of homicides of persons who had
played some
significant role in the struggle against Castro or as
leaders of the
exile community took place in the United States. These
events,
like all homicides, are significant from a law enforcement
point of
view, but their precise connection with the terrorism under
discussion
here is far from clear. The overall impact of these
deaths, by
reason of the personalities involved, t he manner of the
killings, and
the treatment the matter received in the media, all
contributed to
create a "climate of terrorism" in Dade County.
Nothing that is
said here should be taken as denying the gravity of the
matter, nor of
suggesting that these killings should not have given rise to
the
highest level of public concern. What is suggested is
that their
purport and place in the general scheme of things may well
have been
misunderstood. As it was, they went to swell the
growing toll of
statistics that suggested the Cuban exile "terrorists" were
getting out
of hand and t hat Dade County was becoming an area having a
distinctive
and perhaps matchless terrorism problem. Naturally
(and quite
rightly), the killing, under still largely unexplained
circumstances,
of seven prominent Cuban exiles in two years, all in some
way or
another connected with the militant movement against Castro,
was going
to alarm and disconcert the community. But was it
terrorism? An indiscriminate classification by
association with
other events of the times is understandable, but unhelpful
for those
who are trying to attain a deeper understanding of the
matter.
The matter is further complicated by reason of the fact that
undoubtedly acts of terrorism were occurring in Dade County
during this
time, as they were elsewhere, in consequence of activities
undertaken
by various elements of the Cuban exile community. Of
these, one,
by reason of its nature and consequences, merits special
attention
here. A bomb placed under the automobile of Emilio
Milian, a
Cuban exile journalist and news director for Miami Radio
Station WQBA
exploded on April 30, 1976, severing both his legs.
This was an
undoubted act of terrorism that seems to have been intended
both to
silence an outspoken critic of the tactics to which the
militants were
now resorting and to serve as a stern warning to
others. This
act, more than any other, brought home the nature of
terrorism to the
larger, law-abiding Cuban exile community, as well as the
other
non-Cuban residents of the area. They could
understand, condone,
perhaps even applaud the campaign designed to strike at
Castro wherever
his interests might be found. Indeed, it still seemed,
to many
Cubans, unpatriotic not to do so. But an act of this
sort,
directed at a peaceable member of their own community
revealed this
violence for w hat it really was. It led to an
unprecedented
questioning of what was being done. If the prime
purpose of the
intensified terrorist campaign was to raise the level of
fear in
Castro's Cuba, it clearly was not having the desired
effect.
There is no doubt, however, that the bombing of Emilio
Milian had a
formidable effect on the Cuban exile population and on the
climate of
opinion, generally, in the United States.
Unprecedented pressure
on law enforcement was brought to bear by responsible
members of the
community to bring those responsible to justice and to
increase
protection for those who might be similarly targeted in the
future. The federal government was strongly urged to
lend its
resources to t he search for the culprits and to make
serious endeavors
to eradicate terrorism from the Cuban exile community.
There were
many who took the view, even if it was not articulated in
such strong
and direct terms, that the federal government, having been
responsible
- albeit with good purpose and a long while back - for the
creation of
this monster, it was now incumbent upon those presently in
office to
destroy it or, at the very least, curb its activities.
Yet the
attitude towards terrorism, as such, remained
ambivalent. Extreme
fanaticism for a cause is not poorly regarded in a Hispanic
community. There were still those who saw little wrong
with the
making and placing of bombs - provided it was not done so
close to
home. As one was to put it in connection with a later
incident,
"If the bomb had something to do with Cuba, why didn't they
put it in
Cuba?"
The strenuous campaign begun by CORU and the loose coalition
that had
existed before it was formed, ran roughly from March through
October,
1976. It is worth recalling, for the purpose of
measurement and
comparison that during time, until the fatal explosion
aboard the Cuban
airliner, an impressive catalogue of violent incidents had
occurred:
February 27, a bombing attack against the Soviet Embassy in
Costa Rica;
April 5, two Cuban fishing boats machine-gunned and sunk,
one fisherman
killed; April 22, two officials of the Cuban Embassy in
Lisbon killed
by a bomb; July 5, Cuban Mission to the United Nations
bombed; July 9 a
suitcase bomb waiting to be placed aboard a Cuban airliner
exploded in
a luggage cart at Kingston, Jamaica; July 10 Cuban Airlines
office in
Barbados bombed; July 11, bombings at Bridgetown, Barbados
of an
office, boat, and automobile owned by BIWI airlines; July
17, (an
exceptionally busy day) bombing of an automobile belonging
to a Cuban
diplomat in Bogota; bombing of an office of Air Panama in
Bogota;
machine-gun attack against Cuban Embassy in Bogota; July 23,
attempted
kidnaping of Cuban Consul General at Merida, Mexico; August
9,
kidnaping of two Cuban Embassy officials in Buenos Aires;
August 18,
Cuban Airlines office in Panama bombed; September 1, bombing
of
Consulate of Guayana in Trinidad. No attempt is
offered here to
evaluate the effectiveness of that campaign, but the list
speaks for
itself as to the truly terroristic nature of what was being
done.
This small group of determined militants was engaged in an
international operation of considerable proportions,
directed by
persons well known in Dade County and maintaining close
links with the
Cuban exile community there and elsewhere. The way in
which the
unsolved homicides of people like Donestevez Dominguez
(found shot at
his place of business April 13, 1976) and Gonzalez Cartas
(discovered
shot in a field outside Miami, May 29, 1976) were viewed in
the
community was substantially colored by the impact of these
other events
taking place overseas. Whether there was, in fact, any
material
connection between them and what that connection might have
been was
unimportant and uninfluential in forming the views of those
whose
exclusive diet in these matters was comprised of media
accounts
embellished by local rumor-mongering. Whatever the
intent of the
perpetrators, a climate of fear was generated in Dade County
that
helped to establish the "track record" of these various
Cuban exile
groups. The names of these groups, and their initials
so
frequently brought to the public notice, began to take on a
substance
that must have been not unpleasing to those engaged in these
activities. At the same time, there was rising concern
among
local law enforcement authorities on account of the
extension of these
violent activities in this international fashion, beyond the
scope of
the resources available to cope adequately with them.
Contemporaneously with the events listed above, that concern
was
vividly, yet realistically expressed by Lieutenant Tom Lyons
and
Investigator Raul Diaz of the Dade County Public Safety
Department in
testimony given before the Sub-Committee to Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act and other
Internal Security
Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate on
May 6, 1976. It is particularly important, in any
review of the
history of this subject, to see how matters appeared, at
that time, to
those who were daily engaged wit the law enforcement
problems
presented. The difficulty of determining the nature of
the threat
posed and in accurately evaluating its magnitude came over
very
clearly, and the lack of real information available to these
officers
os as to be able to cope with the problem as well as to be
able to
respond to the Sub-Committee's concerns is very strongly
apparent.
Another most material happening, that was to have
far-reaching
consequences, occurred in Washington, D.C. on September 21,
1976.
A car carrying Orlando Letelier, a former Chilean Ambassador
to the
United States under Salvador Allende, and two companions,
exploded
while traveling around Sheridan Circle only a few blocks
from the
Chilean Embassy. An explosive device that had been
placed in Dr.
Letelier's automobile was detonated by remote control
killing Dr.
Letelier and his companion Ronni Moffit, who was hit by a
shard of
metal, wounding also her husband, who had been treveling in
the back
seat. That such an event could have been protagonized
by foreign
interests in the heart of the nation's capital was
exceptionally
shocking to many and had very frightening implications for
security
during the United States presidential election, then little
over a
month away. The operation had been carried out with
great
precision and showed an unusual degree of sophistication and
expertise. It was evidently the kind of operation that
those
having some sort of "official" backing can accomplish more
readily than
those who do not. What was even more shocking than the
event
itself to many people, who had no vested political interest
in the
affair, was the apparent inability of the appropriate law
enforcement
authorities to penetrate to the heart of the affair and to
assign
responsibilities in the matter. It was recognized that
prosecution of the perpetrators might prove difficult, but
the not
unnatural suspicion that the Chilean government of General
Pinochet
might somehow be directly involved gave the investigation an
extraordinary political importance as well as its delicate
character. There were other more sinister suspicious
that were
being planted and propagated by those whose campaign in all
matters of
this kind was now swinging into full gear. There were
ugly
suggestions that agencies of the United States were
themselves involved
in this affair, and that much of the mystery surrounding it
and the
apparent inability of law enforcement to solve it to the
public
satisfaction were part and parcel of a deliberate cover-up
such as the
public was now accustomed to seeing exposed by the new and
most
effective profession of "investigative journalism".
This was at a
time when United states involvement in the overthrow of
Salvador
Allende was coming to light, and the CIA's role in that as
well as the
Agency's earlier involvement with the Cuban exiles was
brought before a
public deliciously thrilled by these discovered
"wrongdoings" of its
public servants. Encouraged by a constant media
campaign, itself
fueled by an understandable desire to find what was
evidently a most
extraordinary story, it was not difficult for the public to
see deadly
assassins of DINA stalking the streets of the District of
Columbia as
they were persuaded, at that time, that the agents of SAVAK
were wont
to do. The whole matter was given substantial credence
by the
identity and character of the victim. Of all the
Chileans in
exile, Dr. Letelier probably constituted the biggest thorn
in the side
of the Pinochet government which was not only fighting to
pull together
an economy that had been plunging recklessly downhill since
long before
Salvador Allende took charge of the nation's destiny, but
also trying
to improve its image, internationally, after a brief but
cruel and
bloody revolution against a constitutional government.
There was
not too much sympathy for Chile, outside of the United
States at that
time, and sympathy within the United States was most
delicately poised
in advance of that country's presidential election.
Orlando
Letelier, from a bse in a leftist Washington, D.C. "think
tank" was
using all his great diplomatic skill and personal charm, as
well as his
considerable economic knowledge, to attack the Chilean
government in
those areas where it was likely to hurt most. It is
probably not
exaggerating to aver that this former ambassador was the
most dangerous
foe of the Pinochet government anywhere in the world.
Into all
this was introduced the suspicion not merely of Chilean
government
involvement and CIA complicity, but the very real
possibility that the
assassination might have been actually accomplished by Cuban
exiles,
acting alone or in concert with Chileans for the
purpose. Viewed
against the background of what was happening elsewhere, the
fingers of
suspicion cannot be said to have been irresponsibly pointed.
It is unnecessary to retail here at any length the
painstaking
investigation that led to a substantial uncovering of the
facts of the
Letelier case and the remarkable expedition with which the
actual
perpetrators were apprehended, taken into custody, and
tried. To
those accustomed to viewing these things on a superficial
basis, it did
much to reassure the American public as to the capacity of
its law
enforcement apparatus when faced with a difficult problem
such as this
case presented. The extradition, trial, and conviction
of the
Chilean agent Michael Townley and the subsequent
apprehension, trial
and conviction of his two Cuban exile accomplices was
impressive in the
extreme and certainly did much to allay public concern that
there
lurked in society's midst a class of protected persons "that
the law
simply could not reach". The event served to confirm
the
connection between the Chileans and the Cubans that was
behind much of
the violence of 1976, but that is not the purpose of its
statement
here. The real significance of these matters goes much
deeper and
has a considerable relevance for the subject matter under
consideration
in this study. The true significance of the event
becomes clear
when reference is made to the words of Lieutenant Lyons in
his
testimony referred to above (pages 631/632); "This is
probably one of
the most complex areas that we have to deal with. It
is made even
more so with the lack of substantive information of an
international
nature because this is, as we have been stating, an
international type
of crime. When the CIA is not allowed to furnish us
information
because of reasons of security and privacy or even internal
controls on
their reports, it makes it just that more difficult for us
to piece
together just what is occurring in our Latin American
community."
It is quite clear that in the Letelier case, all these
inhibiting
considerations were swept away in the interests of
establishing the
credibility of the long arm of United States criminal
justice once it
had been decided to extend it in this matter. Without
the
appropriate directive at the highest level of
responsibility, it would
have been impossible to have identified those responsible,
much less to
have brought them to justice before a court of competent
jurisdiction
in the United States. This is an encouraging example
of what can
be done provided there exists the desire to do it.
Clearly, those
who perpetrated this crime had reason to believe that the
formidable
arm of the United States would not be raised against
them. At a
different time in the nation's history, it might well not
have
been. This serves to highlight the "political" nature
of the
administration of justice in this area and the very real
concerns it
raises for law enforcement personnel. It serves to
give point and
substance to the arguments of those who claim that if
similar
facilities were made available in some of the cases that
have occurred
in or have been the concern of the law enforcement
authorities in Dade
County, these too would be cleared in similar fashion.
The
argument is a strong one, and while no attempt is made to
adjudicate
upon it here, it is clear that while there is even the
suspicion -
justifiable or otherwise - that official information is
being held back
from those charged with investigating these cases, public
confidence in
the probity of the investigation is not well served, and the
confidence
in t he probity of the investigation is not well served, and
the
confidence of law enforcement in its own abilities is
weakened.
The belief that there is a class of "protegidos" to whom the
United
States is in some way indebted or by which it is compromised
by
association, is one that dies hard in the Cuban exile
community.
It is one which substantially colors the views taken of some
of the
events described and it is one that has dangerous and
continuing
implications for law enforcement in the area of
terrorism. Fact
is much less important than cynical belief in these delicate
matters.]
The real beneficiary of this violence that began and
substantially
ended in 1976 was, as is so often the case, Fidel
Castro. It
provided a convenient excuse and something of a smokescreen
behind
which he was able to hide some of the major shifts of policy
in which
he was then engaged. Some of the CIA attempts on
Castro's life (a
few, bizarre in the extreme) had now become public
knowledge.
There were others that the Cuban leader had been inclined to
take more
seriously. He was now, especially following the crash
of the
Cuban Airliner, able to point to all this violence with
great
indignation, some of it probably quite real, and to claim
that the CIA
was once more master-minding these strikes. None could
deny that
at one time or another, many of those engaged in this
violence,
including Orlando Bosch had once had the closest
associations with the
CIA. The real unproven question raised by Castro at
this time was
whether these associations continued and what they
portended.
Certainly, to the unbiased, Castro raised a good prima facie
case. He was able to point to a certain cordiality of
relationships existing between Bosch, a rabid,
self-confessed
perpetrator or intellectual author of a variety of
terroristic
activities, and high officials of the Venezuelan government
known to
have or to have had links with the CIA. He was able to
demonstrate the connection between these relationships and
those known
to exist between Bosch and the government of Chile. He
could
argue quite convincingly that these would never have been
established
without some assistance from a third party such as the
CIA.
Whatever the truth of these involved matters, Castro acted
with a
certain amount of expeditious concern and not only
capitalized,
propaganda-wise on the events, but succeeded in curtailing
Bosch's
welcome in Venezuela. Bosch and his companions were
arrested by
the Venezuelan authorities and are incarcerated at the
present time
awaiting the outcome of judicial inquiry into various
matters imputed
to them. There are persistent rumors that this matte
may be
drawing to a close and that Orlando Bosch may shortly be
released in
Venezuela. The abatement of this violence during Bosch
may
shortly be released in Venezuela. The abatement of
this violence
during Bosch's incarceration since 1976 can hardly be
coincidental, and
the possibility of a renewal of the violence on his release
- following
the earlier precedent in his case - cannot be
discounted. He
continues to have important links with the exile community
in Dade
County and while a warrant is out for his arrest in
connection with his
parole violation, his return to the area after he is put in
liberty by
the Venezuelans cannot be ruled out. In any event, his
release
and a subsequent return to his former activities is certain
to have
repercussions in Dade County regardless of where he might
eventually
settle and make a base. Bosch has, in the past, shown
an informed
sense of political timing and he is likely to have learned
from past
errors.
While these events of a violent nature have been taking
place, life for
the Cuban exile community has proceeded on a more prosaic
but
ultimately more useful level. Twenty years is quite a
long time
on this scale of events, time enough to put down firm roots
in new soil
and time to be radically affected by the dramatically
increased tempo
so well explained by Alvin Toffler in "Future Shock".
This is no
longer a "refugee" community in the conventional sense; the
United
States and the rest of the world have a much more pressing
refugee
problem on their hands in 1979. The trauma of the old
upheaval is
still painfully evident and many adjustments have yet to be
made.
But both the United States and the Cubans themselves have
become
substantially reconciled to the fact that this is their new,
permanent,
home, and "this" means Dade County. By any standard,
it is one of
the most extraordinary transplants of modern times.
What all this
holds for the future is not a task to be examined here, but
there are
already signs that it will be, so far as the problem of
terrorism is
concerned, quite drastically different from the past.
New
community leaders are emerging and these, though ever
mindful of the
legacy of disillusionment and dispossession that these
exiles cannot
yet shake off, are courageously engaging in what may be
termed a
"politics of reconstruction". It is based less on
consuming
hatred for a remote adversary from the past than on a real
desire to
capitalize upon this community's tremendous potential for
the
future. It recognizes the historical facts and makes
no apologies
for them; but it is not weighed down by them either.
This is a
community that had become genuinely concerned about its own
potential
for self-destruction. It had seen the possibility of
internecine
violence in its midst and wanted no part of it. It had
become
concerned even about taking the traditionally "patriotic"
view of
supporting violence abroad, while condemning it in the
United
States. The events of 1976 had clearly shown that the
distinction
could not always be so neatly made. The community had
made great
material progress, beyond the wildest dreams of some.
They had
shared, and shared fairly in what were mainly "good" years
for those
who lived in the United States. Most would have had to
think very
carefully before opting for a return to Cuba, on the
assumption that
their homeland had been recovered and scoured forever of
communist
influence. Further progress, materially and
spiritually depended
to a large extent upon a quiet acceptance of matters as they
are.
And this, naturally, forces an unpleasant but necessary
recognition of
Castro and all he stands for an has come to symbolize for
the exiled
population. This is a very hard thing indeed to do,
but it is not
unique. The same choice faces the Arabs with regard to
the
existence of the State of Israel. The "fanatics" among
the Cuban
exiles may very appropriately be compared with those in
Islam who
cannot and will not ever accept the consequences of the
stroke of
history that brought the State of Israel. The
"fanatics" among
the Cuban exiles may very appropriately be compared with
those in Islam
who cannot and will not ever accept the consequences of the
stroke of
history that brought the State of Israel into
existence. Others
have shown themselves more malleable and although risking
their
political positions and perhaps eve ntheir very lives, have
decided
upon an accommodation with their adversaries that they hope
will
redound to their own greater advantage. Such choices
are never
easily made. They are even more difficult to translate
into terms
of practical politics. They are a fertile breeding
ground for
terrorism. Nevertheless, the Cuban exile community
towards the
end of 1978 made that choice, with all the consequences,
good and bad,
that it entails.
The present situation has been a long time in the
making. With
hindsight, it serves to explain some of the events of
earlier times and
to rationalize some of the violence of 1976 in terms of a
brittleness
designed to resist the inevitable. Indeed, what
occurred in 1977
may have been, at least in part, a reaction to the violence
of
1976. On September 1, 1977 the United States and Cuba
established
"Interest Sections" in Washington and Havana, marking a
renovation of
direct, diplomatic contact between the two countries for the
first time
in sixteen years. Meanwhile, unadvertized talks were
proceeding
between some influential members of the Cuban exile
community and the
Castro government. The principal topics of discussion
were the
release of political prisoners held by the Castro regime and
the
re-unification of families. A group of young exiles of
the
Antonio Maceo Brigade visited Cuba in that same year to work
as
volunteers, talk with Cuban officials, and see
relatives. At a
news conference on September 6, 1978, Castro made a dramatic
offer,
inviting members of the "Cuban community abroad" to "A
Dialogue" aimed
at setting the stage for a comprehensive program of freeing
the
political prisoner, reunifying families, and allowing exiles
to return
as visitors to the island. This conciliatory gesture
by Castro
was regarded with the greatest of suspicion by even the most
interested
members of the community, but the benefits and hopes it held
out were
too great to be resisted save by the most intractable.
The "two
Cubans" thus began the process of dialogue which, while not
leading to
a political reconciliation as such, was to change completely
the
premises upon which the exile community had based much of
its
existence. The changes were rapidly translated into
practical
action. In the first three months of 1979, nearly
22,000 exiles
had traveled to Cuba, and it was confidently expected that
more than
100,000 would do so before the year's end. The effect
this has
had on the community as a whole is profound. This has
been a time
of confusion and agonizing choices for the "Cuban community
abroad". The Miami Herald in an evocative article on
the subject
published April 8, 1979, described the situation as giving
rise to a
choice between "Blood and Politics". It is, perhaps,
rather the
fashioning of a new kind of politics. A clear
majority, judged by
its conduct, is in favor of the change, of some sort of
dignified
rapprochement that will allow the two communities to live
their
separate fashions but yet remained united by the ties of
blood rather
than bitterly divided by the dictates of politics. Yet
others
remain unreconciled to the changes that twenty years of
history have
wrought and are, if anything, further hardened in their
resolve to
fight in to the bitter end. There is a certain Latin
pride
involved here that can make no concession to the victor;
indeed, it
will not even concede him his victory. This spirit is
expressed
in a letter published in U.S. News and World Report, May 28,
1979, and
is worth pondering in the present context:
"Exiles insult the dead, the incarcerated, every tragic
victim of the
Caribbean satrap when they visit Castro's Cuba for any
purpose other
than to help overthrow the abominable regime.
Confiscation of
private property, end to freedom of assembly and of the
press,
government by ukase, church worship a treasonable act,
debased living
standards - this and more has been Castro's Cuba.
Self-respecting
Cubans can never condone it or reconcile with this
political, social
and economic wasteland of tyranny and poverty."
The principal vehicle through which this attempted
accommodation with
Castro is being approached is a loose coalition of interests
that has
titled itself The Committee of 75. This group of
community
representatives has a dangerous and daunting task before
it.
Again the comparison with President Sadat of Egypt invites
itself. A sudden, bold initiative has challenged
fundamental
assumptions and has polarized opposition. The
Committee of 75 has
twenty years of hatred and suspicion to overcome and it has
but a
fragile constituency to which to appeal. Like
President Sadat, it
will be judged by results. In a community that has
traditionally
given little credit for altruism and has seen enough
political
speculation in the past to make it truly cynical, it may be
difficult
to live up to expectations of the kind raised. But for
those who
have chosen to be a part of this endeavor, there is now only
the road
forward, for there can be no turning back. A high
price has
already been exacted for the progress made. A member
of the
Committee, Carlos Muniz, aged 26, a member of the Antonio
Maceo
Brigade, a tour operator in Puerto Rico promoting visits to
Cuba was
murdered in San Juan on April 28, 1979. The precise
connection
between the death of this young man and the intricate
politics of the
moment is far from clear, but it is really unimportant for
the present
purposes. What is significant are the interpretations
being given
to his demise, the speculation surrounding its implications
for the
safety of others, and the impact of all this on the
community. It
would be premature to jump to conclusions regarding this
matter or even
positively to assign political motives to this
killing. The
experience of the past suggests that it is all too easy to
forge links
that are stronger than the best available evidence can
bear. One
is tempted to enquire why, if this indeed was an attack upon
the
Committee of 75 through this member of it, a more prominent
member of
it was not chosen for the purpose and why the killing was
not carried
out in Miami where, one would have supposed, it might have
had the most
fearful effect upon the community. Most certainly
other members
of the Committee have been harassed and threatened both
before and
after the death of Muniz, but, so far, none has been
physically
attacked. This cannot be on account of the protection
these
people are assumed to enjoy, for few have bodyguards and
their overall
security is not such as to give them adequate protection
against the
type of attacks that have taken place in the past.
These
observations should not be taken as detracting in any way
from the very
real assessment of danger that each of these individuals
must face as a
result of his or her participation in the work of this
Committee.
All must have been aware of this when they took upon
themselves,
voluntarily, these obligations for the community as a
whole. But
a hysterical, over reactive approach is unlikely to be of
much
protective value. Just such an approach is that taken
by The
Miami Herald Editorial of May 5, 1979, under the title
"Terrorism Among
Cubans Calls for Immediate Action". The florid
language of that
article can hardly have contributed to lowering the tensions
existing
in a polarized community and can only be calculated to
increase
whatever apprehensions are currently felt. It is, of
course, an
undisguised appeal for federal assistance and, in so far as
this might
be appropriate to the case, the appeal is only to be
welcomed. It
will be interesting to see if it is sustained if it is
carried to its
logical conclusion. It is material to cite in full one
portion of
the Editorial having a bearing on this : "Only Federal
authorities have
the resources fully to combat terrorism linked to Cuban
politics.
The conspiracies involved, if any, almost certainly are both
interstate
and international. Suspects and witnesses are
scattered over
thousands of miles. Local authorities can only help;
they cannot
solve the problem". This language, from a different
standpoint,
is strikingly like that contained in the Lyons testimony to
which
reference has been made. The real issue involves the
ability to
obtain and utilize information; it is not a narrow
jurisdictional
one. Would the Herald and other concerned media
interests support
such a needed move to expand the law enforcement
intelligence
system? This is a public relations matter which needs
to be
carefully addressed.
Good cases are spoiled by latent or patent
exaggeration. Some
statements take on an overpowering flavor from the context
in which
they are set. The same editorial dealing with
"Terrorism" reports
that "Federal and local law enforcement authorities
investigated more
than 100 bombings and six political murders in South Florida
between
1973 and 1976." The inference is surely that all this
constituted
unassailable evidence for a "wave of politically inspired
terrorism"
that "must not be permitted to return". While all
would agree
that everything must be done to keep the community free from
violence
of any sort, such uncritical statements are unpersuasive and
unhelpful
to the case. When these bombings are considered on a
case by case
basis, many are seen to be the result of private matters,
some were
done for self-advertisement and others had criminal
extortion as t heir
purpose. It is not necessary to examine here, in
detail, each of
the six "political" murders to which reference is made, but
most if not
all can only be regarded as such in the sense that the
victim had at
some time or another been engaged in politics.
Certainly few if
any of these individuals to whom allusion is made were
killed because
of their politics. It is far from clear what enhanced
federal
involvement is being sought here. Unless there is
evidence of a
violation of a federal criminal statute, it would be grossly
improper
for state and local law enforcement to be superseded.
It is just
such a supersession that the Herald Editorial seems to call
for and it
does great disservice to the proper law enforcement
authorities having
jurisdiction over the matter and raises unwarranted
expectations in the
larger readership that cannot be expected to appreciate
these
niceties. It cannot help abate the understandable
concerns of the
community or to lower the climate of terrorism by weakening
public
confidence in the capabilities of its law enforcement
system.
Since that controversial Editorial was published, much of
its substance
has already taken on a moot quality. The matter has simply
been
overtaken by events of a much grimmer kind than those
presaged by the
writer of the Editorial. Dade County has been struck
by an
unparallel wave of non-politically inspired violence beside
which
anything done by militant Cuban exiles in their hey-day
pales into
insignificance. Recent though these events are, they
still belong
to history, but they represent the "tail" of the immediate
future; the
beast is but a little way ahead. How much of this
violence can be
properly described as terrorism must await a more leisurely
examination
of the evidence. A pattern is certainly forming
already, and what
is known gives cause for the greatest public concern.
Politically
inspired terrorists operating in the Cuban exile community
were, in the
main, very careful not to alienate their
"constituency". They did
not engage in indiscriminate or even incautious killing;
their victims
were carefully chosen and dispatched with a minimum of
danger or even
inconvenience to the general public. The message of
fear was
clearly written, but it was carefully addressed and was not
specially
broadcast throughout the community. There was much
boasting, much
ugly rhetoric, but the average Cuban resident of Dade County
had little
to fear from even the most rabid militant, in the sense of
some direct
assault upon his person or property. Politically
inspired
terrorism reaps relatively high dividends in terms of the
fear quotient
for the expenditure of comparatively little real
effort. The
current drug-related violence carries with it a high degree
of
involuntary involvement for the citizen at large. The
killings
that took place in Dadeland Mall in July, 1979 were reckless
in the
extreme; anyone who had the misfortune to be in the vicinity
at the
time of the action was quite likely to have been
targeted. Once
started, these "wars" are exceedingly difficult to
stop. The
words of the Editorial of May 5 can be nicely adapted with
but little
variation to the present situation; only they are even more
apposite
when so amended. There it was said: "The danger, as
this
community learned to its sorrow in 1975, is that a wave of
politically
inspired terrorism, once unleashed, takes on a momentum of
its
own." The only recommended addition to make that
observation
germane to the present situation is the word "non" before
"politically-inspired". A full history of this wave of
violence
will make interesting professional reading. It will
certainly be
most productive of knowledge concerning non-political
terrorism and its
impact on a community such as that of Dade County.
What is highly
significant is the new dimension that has been added to the
terrorism
picture by the incursion of "outsiders", violence-prone
individuals who
are not a part of the now-stable resident Hispanic
community.
All history, like cartography, is a compromise. It is
largely a
matter of perspective how it is reported and what is made,
by way of
exposition and commentary, of those reports. Some
things are
drawn larger than life, while others appear unduly
small. Much
depends on the historian's purpose. Here the objective
has been
to provide a tool by which the dimensions of the problem
might be
usefully examined. It is material to enquire as to
what was, in
the past, called terrorism by law enforcement, by the media,
by the
public. How serious a problem, in retrospect, was
this?
What might have been done to alter the course of history, to
reduce the
impact of this on the life of the community? A review
of history
allows for such speculation, a sort of "Monday morning
quarter-backing"; "those who do not learn the lessons of the
past are
compelled to repeat them in the future." There are
many such
lessons to be drawn upon for the purposes of the present
study.
Firstly, there is the danger of taking the narrow view;
those who are
in the trenches generally see very little of the
battle. It is
understandable that those actually involved in the action
should see a
larger and less meaningful portion of the canvas than those
who are
able to stand back and take a more expansive view. The
historical
perspective offers useful correction to the narrow view
formed at the
time. It is useful to recall that while Miami was
suffering from
the politically inspired violence of 1975, that is now so
vividly
recalled by some, that it was not alone in these
matters. On
October 27, 1975, ten bombings were carried out by the FALN
in an
attempt to gain attention for Puerto Rican independence and
the release
of Puerto Rican "political prisoners". On October 31,v
1975, the
very day Rolando Masferrer Rojas was assassinated in Miami,
the New
World Liberation Front was blowing up a storage building in
California
in support of Puerto Rican independence, while the Emilio
Zapata Unit
was bombing a Safeway store not far away. It is little
comfort to
the inhabitants of Dade County to know that others are
suffering the
same problems, though for different reasons,
elsewhere. But it is
very necessary for those organizing and directing the
response to keep
the wider picture in mind. In the struggle against
terrorism it
is always to avoid overaction. To overreact
emotionally and
materially is to play into the terrorists' hands. The
first
serves only to alarm the community and to heighten the level
of fear,
thus doing the terrorist's job for him. The second is
simply
wasteful and the mistake has been repeated over and over
again.
Whole armies have been tied down by a handful of
terrorists. The
indiscriminate use of manpower and material does little to
curb the
problem and may, on occasion be positively dangerous; the
Howard
Johnson incident which took place in New Orleans on January
7, 1973, in
a case in point. General Grivas pointed out that you
do not hunt
field mice with tanks; a cat will do the job much
better. A needs
assessment study must be primarily concerned with findings
the right
kind of cat for the job and training it to do its work
well. The
lessons of history, if well learned, can serve as useful
orientation
for the future.
An overview of past
terrorism by types - A summary
Politically inspired
terrorism
This has been, until recently, by far the commonest kind of
terrorism
occurring in Dade County. It has been almost
exclusively Cuban in
origin and related to matters of interest to the Cuban
community in
exile. Quantitatively, bombing has predominated, but
there have
been political killings and widespread extortion to finance
these
militant movements. Kidnaping and hostage-taking have
not been
featured activities in Dade County. Some skyjacking
out of Miami
took place during the period when this crime was more
prevalent, and
although Cuba was a destination, political motivation so far
as it
related to the Cuban exile struggle was not in point.
Discriminating analysis of violent events involving the
Cuban exile
population in Dade County shows the number that can be
positively
assigned to this category to be much smaller than is the
case
impressionistically.
Non-politically inspired
terrorism
This has not constituted a significant problem in Dade
County until
comparatively recently. The "old" organized crime
interests,
concerned mainly with gambling, money-lending and vice
settled their
disputes in an orderly way. Their impact on the
community at
large was of an insidious but non-threatening
character. Such
"terrorism" as existed was largely an internal matter.
The
narcotics trade has radically changed this picture and the
fact that
this, in Dade County, is now largely in Hispanic hands has
disturbed
the overall position considerably. A power struggle is
proceeding
for control of the drug traffic engaged in form this area
and this is
giving rise to a great deal of violence, some of it of a
terroristic
nature. An exact appreciation of its kind and quantity
cannot
usefully made at this time, but it is safe to opine that it
currently
presents a more serious problem for the community than does
its
politically inspired counterpart.
International or
transnational terrorism
Some of the politically inspired terrorism protagonized by
the Cuban
exile groups has had this character. Operations have
been planned
and prepared elsewhere and executed in Dade County.
There have
been links and movements that have substantially passed
beyond the
jurisdictional, if not the investigative bounds of local law
enforcement authorities. There have, so far, not been
activities
of an overt nature by other international, politically
inspired
terrorists in the Dade County area. No information has
revealed
planning or preparatory action by any Palestinian group,
Iranians,
Puerto Ricans, or any of the many active Left Wing Latin
American
groups. The recent, non-politically inspired
terrorism has
been of a transnational type involving mainly Columbians.
Domestic terrorism
This, again, has been almost exclusively related to internal
struggles
within the Cuban exile community or in protest against
United States'
policies with regard to Cuba. Most of the terrorist
bombings that
have taken place in Dade County can be so classified.
The
bombings by Rolando Otero Hernandez in March/April, 1975,
are typical
examples of what might be assigned to this category.
No black or
white-anglo groups have been active in Dade County for many
years. It should be recalled, in an historical context
that
although El Poder Cubano was organized and operated out of
Dade County,
its domestic terrorist activities especially during 1968,
were
nationwide. On July 19 of that year, it was
responsible for three
bombings in Los Angeles, for another on August 3 in New York
City, and
yet another in Miami on August 17.
High technology
terrorism
There has been no evidence of anything that could be so
characterized
in the Dade-Miami area. This is not particularly
surprising, as
there has been, as yet, very little manifestation of such
developments.
Most of the terrorism taking place in Dade County or
associated with it
in any way has been, technologically speaking, of a
comparatively low
order. This is not due to any backwardness or lack of
knowledge
in the community. The potential is clearly there, for
the
Letelier bombing was indicative of considerable skill.
It is also
interesting to note that Florida Power and Light employs an
unusually
large number of Cuban engineers. While there have been
no threats
involving this type of terrorism in Dade County, it is worth
recalling
that on October 27, 1970, in Orlando, Florida, a 14 year old
science
student demanded $1,000,000 and a safe conduct or he would
explode a
hydrogen bomb, of which he submitted a credible diagram.
Quasi terrorism
There has been a lower incident of this type of criminality
in
Dade-Miami than in many other comparable population centers
elsewhere. Quite strikingly, there have been very few
hostage-taking incidents and this seems to have followed the
pattern
established by politically inspired terrorists. The
Dade County
Public Safety Department, the City of Miami Police
Department, and the
City of Miami Beach Police Department all have excellently
trained SWAT
teams that have had very little employment in this regard
during the
last few years.
End of Page
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