History of Terrorism
Dade County - Miami, Florida 1979
[REFERENCE: Needs Assessment Study,
Terrorism in Dade County, Florida, Grant #78-TA-AX-0006. Final Report
by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc. July 1979,
Chapter Three]
A SHORT HISTORY OF TERRORISM IN DADE-MIAMI
Writing a short history of anything is always a most challenging
task. The significant adjective is an injunction to be brief, but
the question is always, what to omit? Writing history is a
revealing of the past, a bringing to light of things that have been
forgotten, or the calling into prominence of things, the significance
of which was not appreciated in their time. This historian is in
an advantageous position, in some ways, for he is able to review
matters with a completeness and detachment that was not possible for
those who lived through the events. Yet, withal, the historian's
work is only a reconstruction, lacking the life and vividness of the
real happenings he seeks to depict. He is, after all, only the
interpreter of his sources and the imperative "Be brief!" enjoins on
him a selectivity authorized only by his own good judgment.
It is all too easy for the most diligent historian, with all the time
and space necessary for completeness, to do violence to the
Truth. He who engages to write a short history will almost
certainly fall into error. This must not be regarded as a fatal
deterrent. Proper consideration of the problems posed by this
study demands a history; there is neither time not space for an
extended one. What follows, with all its faults, must suffice for
the purpose. T he first dilemma, as always, is where to
begin? Nowhere does terrorism have a neat, precisely documented
beginning. Even the most seemingly authoritative statements can
be misleading. The Staff Report of the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights states: "Terrorism is not new. It can be
traced to an ancient Arab group, the Society of Assassins, and the
French Revolution's ‘Reign of Terror'". Some six hundred years
separate these two unconnected matters. While terrorism may not
be traceable with such pristine certainty, the authority on which part
of this statement rests can. Professor Bernard Lewis, in his book
The Assassins (1968) wrote: "In one respect, the Assassins are without
precedent - in the planned systematic and long-term use of terror as a
political weapon...they may well be the first terrorists".
Brevity, therefore, has its price. Categorical statements of this
kind must always be viewed with suspicion.
It is simply not possible to say when terrorism in Dade County began;
probably there has been some terrorism as defined in this study, ever
since the County was extensively settled. What is certain is that
it did not become a community or a law enforcement problem of any
magnitude until comparatively recently. Terrorism in South
Florida generally, and Dade County in particular, whether of the
politically inspired or non-politically inspired variety, is
historically tied in a very direct way to relations with the island of
Cuba. Although Dade-Miami has enjoyed a constant interchange with
other neighboring Caribbean peoples, notably those of the Bahamas, it
is Cuba that has left its deepest impress upon this portion of the
mainland, and has so radically altered its culture and outlook on
life. From the start, the reasons have been overwhelmingly
political. The island is very close to the continental United
States, well within small boat range. From the time of the
liberation of the island, as a consequence of the Spanish-American war,
the military and political interests of the United States have been
evident, and only the good faith of President Theodore Roosevelt stood
in the way of an outright annexation of the island. Even today,
as the United States plans its withdrawal from the Canal Zone of
Panama, it maintains a naval base at Guantanamo on this otherwise
communist-held island. Cuba has always been a vibrant,
progressive island by comparison with its neighbors. But for all
the brightness and liveliness of its people, its infectious rhythms and
Caribbean setting, Cuba in the 1950's was a backward country, raddled
by corruption and vice, and in the grip of a cruel dictatorship.
The tourist drawn by the bright lights and t he good life of Havana saw
little of this and cared even less. Organized crime had a strong
hold on the island's vice and American business an equally firm grip on
its fragile economy. Not even a fervent patriotism, a strong
communist party, and the makings of effective labor organization seemed
likely to disturb that. Yet resistance to Batista grew, both at
home and abroad, and Dade County began to experience, without realizing
it, a foretaste of what was to come. There was plotting and
gun-running, and much traveling to and from the island. Miami was
a logical jumping-off point for any operations against the regime then
in power, and a convenient place to return to for R & R when a
period of revitalization was necessary, or when things simply became
too hot. Then, at the end of the Eisenhower years, there appeared
a young man called Fidel Castro who was destined, among other things to
change the way of life of Dade Count forever.
Fidel Castro has been in the public eye for a long while. He has
rarely shunned publicity; indeed, at times, he has actively courted
it. Still he remains, in many respects, an enigma; the definitive
biography of Fidel Castro has still to be written. For those
Americans who had as little stomach for Fulgencio Batista as their
counterparts today have for Anastasio Somoza, the sudden advent of this
loquacious, energetic mountain fighter, permanently dressed in
fatigues, did not seem a bad thing. From what was known of him,
he did not seem noticeably anti-American and there was some evidence,
at least, that he might comfortably adjust to living within the United
States' sphere of influence. His opponents, meanwhile temporarily
defeated, had crawled off to South Florida for what most felt certain
would be a very short stay before the next round, which was sure to go
in their favor. By mid-1959, there began a definite leftward
drift on the part of Castro, disconcerting and confusing to many in
charge of United States' policy, and frankly alarming to many Cubans
who had either remained helpfully neutral or were even actively siding
with the new regime up to that point. A steady stream of Cuban
refugees began to join those already in Dade County. It is
interesting to review the progression of that migration. The
rich, the intellectuals, the opposition politicians came first; they
had long enjoyed close ties with South Florida. Then, after a
while, came the middle classes. And finally, as the floodgates
opened, the small entrepreneur and on down to the lowest strata of t he
community. Castro was not long in crossing his Rubicon. In
1960, he expropriated American businesses and, with little economic
alternative, cast himself firmly into the Soviet camp. This was
enough to show the United States where it really stood, and the huge
exodus of refugees was enthusiastically welcomed into South Florida as
an earnest of the United States' intentions to topple the Castro
regime, restore American business to its former glory, and to send
these grateful Cuban citizens back victorious to their homeland.
There is no need here to catalogue the miscalculations and disasters
that prevented those good intentions from bearing the desired
fruit. Much money and energy was expended in organizing to that
end and the fugitive Cuban community that by 1962 had grown to over
150,000 could hardly complain at that time that it had been betrayed or
that the United States was half-hearted in the execution of its
trust. As late as December, 1962, President Kennedy welcoming
back the 1,113 Bay of Pigs prisoners exchanged for $30,000,000 worth of
medical supplies could promise to return them their battle flag in a
"Free Havana". The battle lines were clearly drawn, and only the
Soviet Union and the threat of World War III stood between Castro and
the fulfillment of that promise. That it was never fulfilled,
cost not only a great deal in the United States prestige and security;
it conferred permanent residence status upon what was to swell to an
alien community of over half a million in South Florida, nearly all of
whom came to settle in Dade County.
The transition from a small, visiting contingent, grateful for shelter,
but eager to recover its homeland, to a dispossessed people condemned
to perpetual exile was not easy to make. The period of transition
was not abrupt, and there were encouraging signs that the United
States, in the first years, had not lost its resolve. Castro was
everywhere depicted as the enemy; any dealings with him - or even
visits to him - were regarded as treasonable by official U.S.A., just
as, on different grounds they were so considered by the Cuban exile
community. More to the point, the United States was lending
considerable covert aid to the exiles in their efforts to organize
themselves into a military force capable of fighting its way back into
power. Hundreds of United States case officers "managed" their
Cuban charges, who were taught the rudiments (and sometimes more) of
the skills it was felt they would require to win back their island
home. This was an exciting, if not very productive, time.
Enthusiasm ran high and the Cubans were convinced that they had a real
prospect of military and political victory. Although no state of
war existed between the United States and Cuba, the legal niceties of
the Neutrality Act and other provisions prohibiting the raising or
training of foreign forces on United States' soil in time of peace were
discreetly ignored. Few had cause to question either the
rightness of what they were doing or the interests in which they were
doing it. This is not the place to examine or stand in judgment
upon the adequacy of what was then done or even, with hindsight, to
evaluate the prospects for success. Two observations must,
however, be made, as they have a bearing on the subsequent turn of
events. The United States never really created an effective army
in exile. Of Cuban bravery and military capacity, there can be no
doubt. It was simply never organized into an effective fighting
machine. Either Castro's real strength was hopelessly misjudged -
a simple, but not uncommon, intelligence failure - or those engaged
about the direction of the business were ambivalent from the
start. The second point is perhaps even more serious. The
anti-Castro movement lacked any real leadership that might have given
it cohesion and led to recognition of a government in exile.
There were many leaders, but no one leader, who might have given the
movement a real cohesiveness and purpose. Once the general
disillusionment set in, both these facts made the absorbtion of the
Cuban exile population by the South Florida area a much easier and less
painful task that it would other wise have been. The Cubans
brought many things with them to the United States including a
distinctive culture and a burning hope for return. What they did
not bring was an organized political structure that was going to carry
over the "old ways" in a fashion likely to conflict with the democracy
into which they were being slowly and almost imperceptibly
absorbed. The result, once the United States had effectively
withdrawn from a fight for which it had shown so little enthusiasm in
the first place, was a period of drift. Some of the brave but
unrealistic soldiers came back again and again to tilt Quixote-like at
the Windmill. This became an exercise in ego-building rather than
a purposeful, military one. A structure of "fighters in exile"
began to emerge but, because of the hopelessness of the struggle, it
had no accompanying political ethos out of which a nation in exile, a
real political entity could coalesce. The bulk of the community
slowly and painfully adjusted to the reality of a new life in an alien
land. And a new, and more realistic "politics" grew gradually out
of this adjustment.
It is difficult to explain, in a few words, how a large, alien
community came so successfully and completely to take over, so
peacefully, a large chunk of desirable United States territory.
The success can, perhaps, be best explained by claiming this result as
a happy accident. Because it was never intended, it happened in a
way that aroused no opposition or even awareness of the process by
which it occurred. The Cuban community itself was too numbed, too
disappointed at its loss to be evincing interests in conquest
elsewhere. Although it clearly did not happen overnight, the
South Florida community has, as it were, only just awakened to the fact
that two major cities in Dade County, Miami and Hialeah, have more than
50 percent of Cuban residents in their populations. Overall, the
Latin population of Dade County is about 33 percent and rising.
The real "Cuban problem" for the area is only just beginning, and the
Dade County Cubans - these new, permanent residents of the United
States - are going to have to contribute substantially to finding some
of the answers that will be required. All of this is directly
material to the terrorist problem in Dade County; not only that which
is already a part of history, but that which is yet to present itself
in the future. New leaders, new politics are emerging to engage
the new social problems that arise out of acquisition and integration
rather than dispossession and the desperate maintenance of a separate,
national identity. This is a painful, somewhat unnatural
process. Once that all-sustaining hate is removed, what is there
to rush in and fill the vacuum? A community that builds too long
on its xenophobia grows up warped, with an inbuilt propensity for
social conflict. The case of Northern Ireland is very much a
point. In particular, the changing needs of the community that
the new politics must serve will assuredly give rise to something that
has, superficially at least, been largely absent hitherto. The
unique nature of the struggle against Fidel Castro gave the Cuban
community in exile the appearance and form of a one-party state.
That "party" was intensely conservative, even reactionary. Of
necessity, that one party was opposed to communism in any shape or
form. It could not tolerate even the suggestion of "fellow
travelers". The defense of its very being as an entity depended
upon it. Freed from that yoke of necessity, the "new" politics
will be able to develop its own right, left, and center. There
will be painful moments while it does so, but do so it must, if the
chronic deformation that has stunted the growth and social happiness of
Ulster is to be avoided in Dade County. This has profound
implications for the future of terrorism in Dade County, for some of
the basic assumptions about whether a certain kind of politically
inspired terrorism, left-wing terrorism in a broad sense, can or might
flourish in a community that has been traditionally antagonistic
towards it will be severely challenged.
Some other pertinent observations concerning the character of this
"invasion" lie within the discretion of the historian touching upon the
present subject. The high concentration of Cubans in the South
Florida area is, itself, the product of accidental circumstances rather
than design; or perhaps, with hindsight, the product of a
miscalculation on the part of the social engineers of the time.
After their initial reception into the United States, it was assumed
that these political refugees, like so many others in the past, would
disperse throughout the United States and would be absorbed and
integrated into comparatively distant population centers. This
simply did not take place, and any move in that direction was soon
reversed. These were a Caribbean people, whose affinity for the
sun and the sea, from which many had garnered a living, was met by the
climate and topography of Dade County more perfectly than any other
place to which they might have migrated. Besides it was the
closest point to their beloved homeland, a convenient place for the
return that virtually all confidently expected. Moreover, South
Florida and its people were good to these "visitors" and there were
none of the acute problems of housing, employment, and racial tensions
that might have been anticipated in the areas to which they had been
notionally assigned. The population growth and its implications
for the area, ethnically, culturally, and linguistically, were simply
not foreseen. By and large, these exiles were a likeable
people. They were industrious, respectful of certain important
American values, and, above all, commitedly anti-communist. What
was less apparent, at the start, was that this was not only a community
in a strange sort of limbo; it was also a community hermetically sealed
from any real interaction with the native community into which it had
been transplanted. That community, relatively small and
easy-going, watched these strange happenings somewhat bemused but with
little real concern. After all, it never anticipated having to
live with the problem in perpetuity. The Cuban community seemed
to ask for comparatively little and its troubles, internally, were
largely its own. It neither sought publicity for them nor shared
them with outsiders. All Americans really needed to know about
these people, so it seemed, was t hat they were against Castro - and
that had commended itself strongly to the governments of the day.
It was with something of a shock, therefore, that the other residents
of Dade County woke up one day in 1973 to the fact that they were now,
by ordinance, a bilingual community. This may seem, at first
sight, to have very little to do with terrorism. In reality, it
has a great deal to do with the perceptions of terrorism in this
community.
There has been very little assimilation by the original community of
this strange human burden imposed upon it by force of
circumstances. Rather, the Cuban community has grown and
developed on its own to the point where, cuckoo-like, it is forcing the
native fledgling from the nest. For many of those who have
witnessed, at first hand, these developments over the years, the Cuban
community remains as mysterious and incomprehensible as when it came;
only now it is larger, more obvious, more powerful - and clearly here
to stay. This mystery was not merely the result of linguistic, or
even a cultural barrier. It was more that there was really little
to share of interest to the majority of the "old" community. The
curious, complicated politics in which the Cubans seemed to indulge,
their pathological hatred of Castro and his regime and everything that
went with being a Cuban in exile, were just too much for the outsider
to grasp - unless some special motive existed for making a study of
these things. It is quite likely that, until some sort of
homeostasis was reached, the two communities could have grown up
harmoniously, side by side, without ever having a greater understanding
of each other's ways - had it not been for the violence. This,
and the way in which it was portrayed and perceived, were what really
brought the Cuban community under scrutiny by those who had so
unconcernedly allowed it to grow up in their midst. Had the
Cubans brought with them an unusually high rate of common crime, or
even a reputation for hot-blooded "Latin" violence, it is unlikely that
this would have caused such concern. It could have been more
readily explained and, perhaps, understood in terms of America's
overall, horrendous crime problem. But this violence was
"political" and was related to a politics that was both foreign and
disconcerting. Moreover, it began to manifest itself at a
troubled time in United States' history, at a time when
self-examination was already beginning to turn to self-doubt.
Talk of terrorism, world-wide, was already hanging heavy in the
air. The American role in Vietnam was being seriously - and often
violently - questioned at home. And the purposes and methods of
many American agencies, most notably the CIA, were being vigorously
probed and "exposed" by the growingly vociferous "New Left". The
"received" image of Castro for the larger population of the United
States - all, that is, save the Cuban exiles - began subtly to
shift. Castro's achievements, in education, social security,
anti-corruption and the like, began to be touted, gaining ready
acceptance in a population that had already embarked upon a most
extraordinary process of self-flagellation. This left the Cuban
exile community in a somewhat incongruous position, namely that of
maintaining its undying opposition to the Cuban Communist leader from a
sanctuary that was coming, increasingly, to perceive him in a more and
more favorable light. While part of that community remained
confused and mainly anxious to bury the past - though not without grief
- and get on with the business of living, others hardened their resolve
and vowed to continue the unequal fight even though they had to do so
alone.
This history of these events can be divided into a number of
convenient, if arbitrary, periods. The first period, during the
presidency of John F. Kennedy, had seen the arming and training of
large numbers of Cuban exiles by the United States for what was to be a
serious military assault to retake the island and overthrow the newly
established Castro regime. The apt terrain of South Florida began
to take on some of the appearance of an armed camp as thousands of the
exiles were trained in skills ranging from the rudimentary to the quite
sophisticated that it was hoped would serve them in their various
tasks. In the present context, too much ought not to be made of
the training by the United States defense forces and the CIA of this
"Secret Army". Certain romantic notions always cling to such
episodes and are purveyed to a public, avid for adventure, and, in the
main, not too well informed about what such work is really all about,
in a way calculated to excite and exaggerate the destructive potential
of such a force. While some covert specialists, with
extraordinary skills, are selected and trained for operations of this
kind, the majority (who had no special qualifications to commend them
for the purpose beyond their nationality and enthusiasm) were given a
training little different from that received by many inducted into the
United States' forces at that time, and in some ways less intensive or
comprehensive. The United States was not producing, as is
sometimes suggested by those given to such hyperbole, a "race of
super-terrorists" who, once the employment for which they had been
trained had failed to materialize, would turn upon the community at
large with their newly acquired skills. Naturally, the skills
taught had an anti-social, domestic use to which they could be
put. But the same argument could be extended with equal accuracy
to all those who served with the United States forces, for example, in
Vietnam - and the hidden slur would be just as great. The United
States was training soldiers to fight an irregular war with the skills
necessary to wage such a struggle. It certainly was not training
"terrorists" as such, nor endowing those whom it trained with terrorist
attitudes and philosophies. These facts should be borne in mind
because, due to the climate of the times and certain, occasional
journalistic license, they have achieved a prominence and significance
beyond what they might properly bear. The failure of the Bay of
Pigs operation and the death of President Kennedy imposed a severe
check on these developments, but did not signal the end of the
period. United States sponsored raids on Cuba continued well into
the period of the Johnson presidency, but the writing was already on
the wall. While the Cuban community was beginning its slow and
painful readjustment to political reality, many of these "surrogates"
for the United States in its "war" with Castro were having to start to
rethink their own position.
The first thought for many - as it is so often in such circumstances -
was to carry on the fight alone. The words of one who had trained
and fought alongside these exiles in earlier times, give a good picture
of the situation: "Without U.S. support, however, we were virtually
powerless to conduct any cohesive, meaningful action. Government
agencies, including the F.B.I., the coast Guard, and Border Patrol and
various Florida law enforcement departments had tightened their
surveillance of exile activities, thus adding immensely to the
difficulties of mounting clandestine military operations. In the
absence of the stabilizing, unifying influence of the Kennedy's and the
CIA in Cuban affairs, dissension prevailed among various exile
political and paramilitary organizations." (Bradley E. Ayers,
"And They were the Pros, Part II", Soldier of Fortune, March,
1978). What happened next was a logical development for those
who, on any appraisal of their own position could only, in
relation to t heir adversary now victorious on so many fronts,
including the United Nations, consider themselves as the "Weak".
Again, the words of the same writer take up the story: "It was in this
atmosphere of discontent and seething frustration in the Miami Cuban
community that a handful of highly trained exiles turned to violence on
their own. They were labeled as militants, at first, then called
radicals. Now they are referred to as international
terrorists". The Years of Disillusionment for the Cuban exile
militants carried many portents for the future of United States' policy
generally, and the change in the United states' world role. The
1965 intervention in Santo Domingo, while constituting an important and
necessary check to Castro in the Caribbean, alienated support for the
United States in much of Central and South America; these countries
were but slowly recovering from the shock of John Kennedy's death,
which affected them very greatly on an emotional plane. Serious
terrorism outbreaks were occurring in Columbia and Argentina, while
Peru and Bolivia both faced a serious problem of insurgency in the
interior. Much of this activity was being actively fostered by
Fidel Castro, and this CIA trained "Secret Army" had, for some of its
members at least, the prospects of useful employment elsewhere.
But, for most, the noble fight was over; if they continued alone, as
many vowed, it was without the official blessing of the United States
and with eve na stern hint at suppression. This latter seemed to
be directed at denying United States soil and, in particular, South
Florida, to the exiles as a staging ground or launching point for
attacks on Cuba that were already attracting international
criticism. Relatively overt, paramilitary operations being no
longer possible, these "militants" turned to terrorism, much of it of a
symbolic or expressive nature. Virtually all of this was planned
and prepared in Dade County, but many of the most significant
operations were undertaken elsewhere, some of them overseas.
The year 1968 saw a significant upswing in the violent activities of
these Cubans exiles who, by now, were beginning to be identified by the
evocative names they had assigned themselves. This was a
significant year for political violence on many fronts. In the
United States, the anti-war protest was at its height and campuses from
Berkeley to Columbia University burned (in some cases literally) with
radical fervor. Students took to the streets in London and Rome,
and the mighty Charles de Gaulle was nearly toppled by a
student/workers coalition. A mishandled protest gave rise to the
formidable West German terrorist movement. Martin Luther King and
Robert Kennedy were assassinated and the decision of President Johnson
not to run for re-election paved the way for Richard Nixon to the White
House. By comparison with these and other portentous events
occurring elsewhere on the world stage, the efforts by the Cuban exiles
to keep their case before the public were puny indeed. Reviewing
the numerous bombings, in Dade County and elsewhere, as well as attacks
on shipping in coastal waters, during the period 1968-1972, one is
struck not only by its lack of coherence, but also by its overall
ineffectiveness. The devices used, their half-hearted employment
lack seriousness when set in their wider historical context. This
was a time of terrorist "spectaculars". Skyjacking was at its
height; the PLO and PFLP were trying to take the world by storm; and
the IRA had begun a savage, deadly campaign in Northern Ireland and the
U.K. Little, if anything the Cubans did, or attempted to do,
could compare with all this, but it is natural that, in a climate of
heightened awareness about terrorism and its potentiality that some of
this concern should have rubbed off on this "alien"outgrowth of this
new community in the United States. El Poder Cubano had, on a
dispassionate evaluation, little more than symbolic or nuisance value,
but it alarmed many by its actions in many parts of the United States,
and served to keep the exile cause alive if not in very good
shape. Perhaps its most spectacular and effective exploit, the
shelling of a Polish freighter in the Port of Miami was overly
ambitious and what let to the temporary abatement of the incipient
terrorism in the form in which it then presented itself. A
pediatrician-turned-terrorist, Dr. Orlando Bosch Avila, was convicted
of this, and it is material note of history that the American elections
of 1968 were coming up, and the federal government was, at that time,
in a much stronger position to take the necessary measures against
these groups than it was subsequently; J. Edgar Hoover was still
Director of the F.B.I. During this time, there was much talk and
comparatively little action among Cuban exile groups for it is evident
that little agreement existed among the proliferation of comparatively
short lived associations. This is, incidentally, characteristic
of politics in Latin America generally, only one party, APRA, being
able to claim anything like a solid history of continuity over many
years. Castro agents were active, too, creating fear and
dissension, and there did not exist that climate of trust and purpose
in which effective counter revolutionary action against Castro might
have been developed. These groups were united only by their
pathological hatred of Castro and a fierce determination to regain
possession of their island. They had no political philosophy in
common, running the spectrum from extreme right-wing, not unfairly
characterized as fascist in the strict sense, to those inclining
towards the position of liberal democrats. There was plenty of
room for ideological and personal disagreement, and petty jealousy, and
great opportunity for Castro to engage in tactics of divide and conquer.
In 1970, there occurred an event far from the center of these
activities that was to have a profound effect upon their subsequent
development. Politics in Chile had been swinging steadily
leftward for more than a decade and only massive intervention by the
Chilean Right, covertly assisted by various United States interests,
public and private, had frustrated a constitutional take-over of power
by the coalition of communists led by Salvador Allende. Allende
finally triumphed through the ballot, and the prospects of another Cuba
in mainland South America seemed very strong indeed. Moreover,
the Peruvian military government that had seized power in October,
1968, was noticeably left-leaning and, unlike any of its predecessors,
was making overtures to the new government of Chile that could have had
far-reaching developments for the security of the hemisphere.
Advisers" from Castro's Cuba were already pouring into the area and an
all-out offensive on American business and other interests seemed.
Imminent. The Cuban exiles took on a new lease of life.
Suddenly, their aspirations once again matched the value of their
skills. In 1972, with the Allende government already heading
towards deep trouble, Dr. Bosch disappeared from Miami in violation of
his parole. A significant link with Chilean Rightists,
themselves, at that moment in the political wilderness, was already in
the course of being forged. While these events did not give the
Cuban exile movement the real cohesion that it needed to become an
effective political force in the fight against Castro, it did provide
it with the fuel necessary to propel it along the road towards an
expanded campaign of terrorism. With the overthrow of the Allende
regime, the new Chilean government of Augusto Pinochet found itself in
the eye of an international storm whipped up by left-wing elements
everywhere. It came, in 1973, when the Nixon administration was
under severe pressure over Watergate, and the American public had
embarked upon that extensive process of soul-searching that was not
only to reveal all sorts of "wrong-doing" on the part of government
agencies at home and abroad, but to end in a severe cramping of law
enforcement styles and capabilities. Into all this, the
rejuvenated militant Cuban exiles leaped with enthusiasm. The
Cuban exile terrorist movement, aided now by an "official" Chile,
anxious to improve its image abroad and get rid of its enemies at the
same time, embarked on an ambitious program of expansion. The
time was no more opportune than it had ever been, but hatred of Castro
was still strong and ingrained in the main Cuban exile population and
the means were now being provided by a sponsor; the Cuban exiles were -
albeit in their own interest - surrogates once more. In the
extensive campaign of terrorism promoted by the Cuban exiles from 1973
onwards, there is no evidence of direct Chilean participation in
anything undertaken in Dade County. This is only to be expected,
for the Chileans were using the Cubans who needed only encouragement
and material support. This period spawned a variety of groups
with imposing sounding titles and rejuvenated others. Some had
imposing charters and tables of organization. The identities of
many of these "militants", acting in one way or another, became a
matter of public knowledge. An air of excitement is clearly
apparent, on any view of the materials relating to the times -
especially 1973- 1975, and those participating in these activities, in
the planning and preparation phase, clearly expected a dramatic
intensification and widening of the struggle. It seems that the
broad intention was to attack selected Cubans, especially those in some
way connected with government, in various places around the
world. In addition, the property of those engaged in commercial
and other relations was to be the subject of this offensive. The
overall objective seems to have been to demonstrate the vulnerability
of the Castro government. It cannot have been expected that these
offensive demonstrations would result only in mild protest from
Castro. Clearly, it has to be anticipated that Castro would
retaliate - and he only logical target for that retaliation would have
been the large exile community lodged in Dade County. It is a
standard terrorist tactic the world over to provoke retaliation from
the opponent, usually the government against which the struggle is
waged. The retaliation falls, inevitably, on the innocent who, it
is theorized, can then be subjected to intensive propaganda designed to
mobilize their fears and anger and marshal these against the
enemy. That such retaliation did not take place can be attributed
either to the lack of concern displayed by Castro and his contempt for
these unworthy opponents, or to his own excellent understanding of the
principles of terrorism as a weapon of war. Whatever the case, in
this regard Castro simply did not rise to the bait.
In fact, Castro seems - whatever he might have been doing behind the
scenes - to have treated most of these attacks with a lofty,
statesmanlike disdain. However he may have felt on a personal
level, he allowed nothing to stand in the way of his steady progress
towards normalization of relations with the United States. The
dependency of Cuba on the Soviet Union should never be
underestimated. Whatever else Castro may be, he is certainly a
realist. While correctly appraising Cuba's value to the Soviet
Union, he is under no illusions about how little leverage, in a
political sense, he really has. Unlike so many other client
states, Cuba cannot play off the great powers one against the
other. Cuba must - for all her seeming independence in foreign
affairs - dance to the Russian tune. It has to be assumed that
Castro was acting in this matter, as in others, to the orders of his
Russian masters in accordance with their overall strategy. The
bombings, the attacks on shipping, the threatened and actual kidnapings
and assassinations brought indignant rhetoric and diplomatic
denunciation, but no reprisals that might have occasioned a rupture in
the softening of the United States' position with regard to improving
relations with Cuba. Castro was clearly determined to play a
waiting game while these interesting "negotiations" with the United
States were in the balance. T he resignation of President Nixon
in August, 1974, does not seem to have had any marked effect on the
resolve of the Cuban exile militants to continue their campaign.
As long as a Republican administration remained in office, they could
be reasonably assured that they would nor be too vigorously pursued for
the unyielding hard line they were committed to taking against
Castro. Moreover, Castro himself now seemed to be taking a
somewhat different line and had commenced, in secret, the expansionist
policy of former years. Now, (doubtless, again under instructions
from Moscow), Castro began secretly dispatching troops to Angola in
breach of a tacit understanding to the contrary that had been reached
with the United States. In that same year, 1975, Cuban exiles
began stepping up their offensive against selected outside of the
United States and there seemed to be clear indications that these
activities were being directed by Dr. Orlando Bosch Arvila, now a
fugitive from federal justice. Dr. Bosch who was traveling
extensively in Central America, the Caribbean, and Venezuela on a
Chilean passport appeared to be directing or coordinating these
activities through Accion Cubana, a Successor to El Poder Cubano.
In June of the following year, an attempt was made to unify the
movement against Castro and to give it some of the cohesiveness it had
earlier lacked. As a consequence, a group known as Coordinacion
de Organizaciones Revolucionarias Unidas (CORU) was formed following a
meeting in the Dominican Republic. This had the effect of
creating something in the nature of an ad hoc "general staff"and was
needed for the greatly increased activity that was now anticipated as a
result of this "pooling" of resources. However patient and
forbearing Castro might have felt up to this point, and however
disinclined to take his opponents seriously in their increasingly
vigorous attacks upon his interests, he was shortly to be presented
with a terroristic episode of unprecedented magnitude and ferocity that
he could not afford to ignore. On October 6, 1976, a Cuban
airliner plunged into the sea off Trinidad killing all seventy-three
persons aboard. A bomb had been placed aboard the aircraft,
evidently in the checked luggage. This was terrorism of a totally
different kind, and many in the Cuban community who had secretly
admired and, in their own various way, supported the brave "freedom
fighters" must have found it difficult to suppress a shudder at the
thought of the innocent victims hurled to their deaths in this
way. Such acts are easy to rationalize for the fanatic; but those
less committed have an understandable difficulty with them. This
act, which brought bitter denunciation from Castro and an evident
resolve to do something about the matter, led to the arrest of Dr.
Bosch and three accomplices by the Venezuelan authorities. They
remain, for the moment, in prison in Venezuela awaiting the
determination of their situation by the relatively unhurried processes
of Venezuelan criminal justice. This act of international
terrorism may be regarded as the watershed of the Cuban exile
movement's campaign to date.
From 1974 onwards, a series of homicides of persons who had played some
significant role in the struggle against Castro or as leaders of the
exile community took place in the United States. These events,
like all homicides, are significant from a law enforcement point of
view, but their precise connection with the terrorism under discussion
here is far from clear. The overall impact of these deaths, by
reason of the personalities involved, t he manner of the killings, and
the treatment the matter received in the media, all contributed to
create a "climate of terrorism" in Dade County. Nothing that is
said here should be taken as denying the gravity of the matter, nor of
suggesting that these killings should not have given rise to the
highest level of public concern. What is suggested is that their
purport and place in the general scheme of things may well have been
misunderstood. As it was, they went to swell the growing toll of
statistics that suggested the Cuban exile "terrorists" were getting out
of hand and t hat Dade County was becoming an area having a distinctive
and perhaps matchless terrorism problem. Naturally (and quite
rightly), the killing, under still largely unexplained circumstances,
of seven prominent Cuban exiles in two years, all in some way or
another connected with the militant movement against Castro, was going
to alarm and disconcert the community. But was it
terrorism? An indiscriminate classification by association with
other events of the times is understandable, but unhelpful for those
who are trying to attain a deeper understanding of the matter.
The matter is further complicated by reason of the fact that
undoubtedly acts of terrorism were occurring in Dade County during this
time, as they were elsewhere, in consequence of activities undertaken
by various elements of the Cuban exile community. Of these, one,
by reason of its nature and consequences, merits special attention
here. A bomb placed under the automobile of Emilio Milian, a
Cuban exile journalist and news director for Miami Radio Station WQBA
exploded on April 30, 1976, severing both his legs. This was an
undoubted act of terrorism that seems to have been intended both to
silence an outspoken critic of the tactics to which the militants were
now resorting and to serve as a stern warning to others. This
act, more than any other, brought home the nature of terrorism to the
larger, law-abiding Cuban exile community, as well as the other
non-Cuban residents of the area. They could understand, condone,
perhaps even applaud the campaign designed to strike at Castro wherever
his interests might be found. Indeed, it still seemed, to many
Cubans, unpatriotic not to do so. But an act of this sort,
directed at a peaceable member of their own community revealed this
violence for w hat it really was. It led to an unprecedented
questioning of what was being done. If the prime purpose of the
intensified terrorist campaign was to raise the level of fear in
Castro's Cuba, it clearly was not having the desired effect.
There is no doubt, however, that the bombing of Emilio Milian had a
formidable effect on the Cuban exile population and on the climate of
opinion, generally, in the United States. Unprecedented pressure
on law enforcement was brought to bear by responsible members of the
community to bring those responsible to justice and to increase
protection for those who might be similarly targeted in the
future. The federal government was strongly urged to lend its
resources to t he search for the culprits and to make serious endeavors
to eradicate terrorism from the Cuban exile community. There were
many who took the view, even if it was not articulated in such strong
and direct terms, that the federal government, having been responsible
- albeit with good purpose and a long while back - for the creation of
this monster, it was now incumbent upon those presently in office to
destroy it or, at the very least, curb its activities. Yet the
attitude towards terrorism, as such, remained ambivalent. Extreme
fanaticism for a cause is not poorly regarded in a Hispanic
community. There were still those who saw little wrong with the
making and placing of bombs - provided it was not done so close to
home. As one was to put it in connection with a later incident,
"If the bomb had something to do with Cuba, why didn't they put it in
Cuba?"
The strenuous campaign begun by CORU and the loose coalition that had
existed before it was formed, ran roughly from March through October,
1976. It is worth recalling, for the purpose of measurement and
comparison that during time, until the fatal explosion aboard the Cuban
airliner, an impressive catalogue of violent incidents had occurred:
February 27, a bombing attack against the Soviet Embassy in Costa Rica;
April 5, two Cuban fishing boats machine-gunned and sunk, one fisherman
killed; April 22, two officials of the Cuban Embassy in Lisbon killed
by a bomb; July 5, Cuban Mission to the United Nations bombed; July 9 a
suitcase bomb waiting to be placed aboard a Cuban airliner exploded in
a luggage cart at Kingston, Jamaica; July 10 Cuban Airlines office in
Barbados bombed; July 11, bombings at Bridgetown, Barbados of an
office, boat, and automobile owned by BIWI airlines; July 17, (an
exceptionally busy day) bombing of an automobile belonging to a Cuban
diplomat in Bogota; bombing of an office of Air Panama in Bogota;
machine-gun attack against Cuban Embassy in Bogota; July 23, attempted
kidnaping of Cuban Consul General at Merida, Mexico; August 9,
kidnaping of two Cuban Embassy officials in Buenos Aires; August 18,
Cuban Airlines office in Panama bombed; September 1, bombing of
Consulate of Guayana in Trinidad. No attempt is offered here to
evaluate the effectiveness of that campaign, but the list speaks for
itself as to the truly terroristic nature of what was being done.
This small group of determined militants was engaged in an
international operation of considerable proportions, directed by
persons well known in Dade County and maintaining close links with the
Cuban exile community there and elsewhere. The way in which the
unsolved homicides of people like Donestevez Dominguez (found shot at
his place of business April 13, 1976) and Gonzalez Cartas (discovered
shot in a field outside Miami, May 29, 1976) were viewed in the
community was substantially colored by the impact of these other events
taking place overseas. Whether there was, in fact, any material
connection between them and what that connection might have been was
unimportant and uninfluential in forming the views of those whose
exclusive diet in these matters was comprised of media accounts
embellished by local rumor-mongering. Whatever the intent of the
perpetrators, a climate of fear was generated in Dade County that
helped to establish the "track record" of these various Cuban exile
groups. The names of these groups, and their initials so
frequently brought to the public notice, began to take on a substance
that must have been not unpleasing to those engaged in these
activities. At the same time, there was rising concern among
local law enforcement authorities on account of the extension of these
violent activities in this international fashion, beyond the scope of
the resources available to cope adequately with them.
Contemporaneously with the events listed above, that concern was
vividly, yet realistically expressed by Lieutenant Tom Lyons and
Investigator Raul Diaz of the Dade County Public Safety Department in
testimony given before the Sub-Committee to Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security
Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate on
May 6, 1976. It is particularly important, in any review of the
history of this subject, to see how matters appeared, at that time, to
those who were daily engaged wit the law enforcement problems
presented. The difficulty of determining the nature of the threat
posed and in accurately evaluating its magnitude came over very
clearly, and the lack of real information available to these officers
os as to be able to cope with the problem as well as to be able to
respond to the Sub-Committee's concerns is very strongly apparent.
Another most material happening, that was to have far-reaching
consequences, occurred in Washington, D.C. on September 21, 1976.
A car carrying Orlando Letelier, a former Chilean Ambassador to the
United States under Salvador Allende, and two companions, exploded
while traveling around Sheridan Circle only a few blocks from the
Chilean Embassy. An explosive device that had been placed in Dr.
Letelier's automobile was detonated by remote control killing Dr.
Letelier and his companion Ronni Moffit, who was hit by a shard of
metal, wounding also her husband, who had been treveling in the back
seat. That such an event could have been protagonized by foreign
interests in the heart of the nation's capital was exceptionally
shocking to many and had very frightening implications for security
during the United States presidential election, then little over a
month away. The operation had been carried out with great
precision and showed an unusual degree of sophistication and
expertise. It was evidently the kind of operation that those
having some sort of "official" backing can accomplish more readily than
those who do not. What was even more shocking than the event
itself to many people, who had no vested political interest in the
affair, was the apparent inability of the appropriate law enforcement
authorities to penetrate to the heart of the affair and to assign
responsibilities in the matter. It was recognized that
prosecution of the perpetrators might prove difficult, but the not
unnatural suspicion that the Chilean government of General Pinochet
might somehow be directly involved gave the investigation an
extraordinary political importance as well as its delicate
character. There were other more sinister suspicious that were
being planted and propagated by those whose campaign in all matters of
this kind was now swinging into full gear. There were ugly
suggestions that agencies of the United States were themselves involved
in this affair, and that much of the mystery surrounding it and the
apparent inability of law enforcement to solve it to the public
satisfaction were part and parcel of a deliberate cover-up such as the
public was now accustomed to seeing exposed by the new and most
effective profession of "investigative journalism". This was at a
time when United states involvement in the overthrow of Salvador
Allende was coming to light, and the CIA's role in that as well as the
Agency's earlier involvement with the Cuban exiles was brought before a
public deliciously thrilled by these discovered "wrongdoings" of its
public servants. Encouraged by a constant media campaign, itself
fueled by an understandable desire to find what was evidently a most
extraordinary story, it was not difficult for the public to see deadly
assassins of DINA stalking the streets of the District of Columbia as
they were persuaded, at that time, that the agents of SAVAK were wont
to do. The whole matter was given substantial credence by the
identity and character of the victim. Of all the Chileans in
exile, Dr. Letelier probably constituted the biggest thorn in the side
of the Pinochet government which was not only fighting to pull together
an economy that had been plunging recklessly downhill since long before
Salvador Allende took charge of the nation's destiny, but also trying
to improve its image, internationally, after a brief but cruel and
bloody revolution against a constitutional government. There was
not too much sympathy for Chile, outside of the United States at that
time, and sympathy within the United States was most delicately poised
in advance of that country's presidential election. Orlando
Letelier, from a bse in a leftist Washington, D.C. "think tank" was
using all his great diplomatic skill and personal charm, as well as his
considerable economic knowledge, to attack the Chilean government in
those areas where it was likely to hurt most. It is probably not
exaggerating to aver that this former ambassador was the most dangerous
foe of the Pinochet government anywhere in the world. Into all
this was introduced the suspicion not merely of Chilean government
involvement and CIA complicity, but the very real possibility that the
assassination might have been actually accomplished by Cuban exiles,
acting alone or in concert with Chileans for the purpose. Viewed
against the background of what was happening elsewhere, the fingers of
suspicion cannot be said to have been irresponsibly pointed.
It is unnecessary to retail here at any length the painstaking
investigation that led to a substantial uncovering of the facts of the
Letelier case and the remarkable expedition with which the actual
perpetrators were apprehended, taken into custody, and tried. To
those accustomed to viewing these things on a superficial basis, it did
much to reassure the American public as to the capacity of its law
enforcement apparatus when faced with a difficult problem such as this
case presented. The extradition, trial, and conviction of the
Chilean agent Michael Townley and the subsequent apprehension, trial
and conviction of his two Cuban exile accomplices was impressive in the
extreme and certainly did much to allay public concern that there
lurked in society's midst a class of protected persons "that the law
simply could not reach". The event served to confirm the
connection between the Chileans and the Cubans that was behind much of
the violence of 1976, but that is not the purpose of its statement
here. The real significance of these matters goes much deeper and
has a considerable relevance for the subject matter under consideration
in this study. The true significance of the event becomes clear
when reference is made to the words of Lieutenant Lyons in his
testimony referred to above (pages 631/632); "This is probably one of
the most complex areas that we have to deal with. It is made even
more so with the lack of substantive information of an international
nature because this is, as we have been stating, an international type
of crime. When the CIA is not allowed to furnish us information
because of reasons of security and privacy or even internal controls on
their reports, it makes it just that more difficult for us to piece
together just what is occurring in our Latin American community."
It is quite clear that in the Letelier case, all these inhibiting
considerations were swept away in the interests of establishing the
credibility of the long arm of United States criminal justice once it
had been decided to extend it in this matter. Without the
appropriate directive at the highest level of responsibility, it would
have been impossible to have identified those responsible, much less to
have brought them to justice before a court of competent jurisdiction
in the United States. This is an encouraging example of what can
be done provided there exists the desire to do it. Clearly, those
who perpetrated this crime had reason to believe that the formidable
arm of the United States would not be raised against them. At a
different time in the nation's history, it might well not have
been. This serves to highlight the "political" nature of the
administration of justice in this area and the very real concerns it
raises for law enforcement personnel. It serves to give point and
substance to the arguments of those who claim that if similar
facilities were made available in some of the cases that have occurred
in or have been the concern of the law enforcement authorities in Dade
County, these too would be cleared in similar fashion. The
argument is a strong one, and while no attempt is made to adjudicate
upon it here, it is clear that while there is even the suspicion -
justifiable or otherwise - that official information is being held back
from those charged with investigating these cases, public confidence in
the probity of the investigation is not well served, and the confidence
in t he probity of the investigation is not well served, and the
confidence of law enforcement in its own abilities is weakened.
The belief that there is a class of "protegidos" to whom the United
States is in some way indebted or by which it is compromised by
association, is one that dies hard in the Cuban exile community.
It is one which substantially colors the views taken of some of the
events described and it is one that has dangerous and continuing
implications for law enforcement in the area of terrorism. Fact
is much less important than cynical belief in these delicate matters.]
The real beneficiary of this violence that began and substantially
ended in 1976 was, as is so often the case, Fidel Castro. It
provided a convenient excuse and something of a smokescreen behind
which he was able to hide some of the major shifts of policy in which
he was then engaged. Some of the CIA attempts on Castro's life (a
few, bizarre in the extreme) had now become public knowledge.
There were others that the Cuban leader had been inclined to take more
seriously. He was now, especially following the crash of the
Cuban Airliner, able to point to all this violence with great
indignation, some of it probably quite real, and to claim that the CIA
was once more master-minding these strikes. None could deny that
at one time or another, many of those engaged in this violence,
including Orlando Bosch had once had the closest associations with the
CIA. The real unproven question raised by Castro at this time was
whether these associations continued and what they portended.
Certainly, to the unbiased, Castro raised a good prima facie
case. He was able to point to a certain cordiality of
relationships existing between Bosch, a rabid, self-confessed
perpetrator or intellectual author of a variety of terroristic
activities, and high officials of the Venezuelan government known to
have or to have had links with the CIA. He was able to
demonstrate the connection between these relationships and those known
to exist between Bosch and the government of Chile. He could
argue quite convincingly that these would never have been established
without some assistance from a third party such as the CIA.
Whatever the truth of these involved matters, Castro acted with a
certain amount of expeditious concern and not only capitalized,
propaganda-wise on the events, but succeeded in curtailing Bosch's
welcome in Venezuela. Bosch and his companions were arrested by
the Venezuelan authorities and are incarcerated at the present time
awaiting the outcome of judicial inquiry into various matters imputed
to them. There are persistent rumors that this matte may be
drawing to a close and that Orlando Bosch may shortly be released in
Venezuela. The abatement of this violence during Bosch may
shortly be released in Venezuela. The abatement of this violence
during Bosch's incarceration since 1976 can hardly be coincidental, and
the possibility of a renewal of the violence on his release - following
the earlier precedent in his case - cannot be discounted. He
continues to have important links with the exile community in Dade
County and while a warrant is out for his arrest in connection with his
parole violation, his return to the area after he is put in liberty by
the Venezuelans cannot be ruled out. In any event, his release
and a subsequent return to his former activities is certain to have
repercussions in Dade County regardless of where he might eventually
settle and make a base. Bosch has, in the past, shown an informed
sense of political timing and he is likely to have learned from past
errors.
While these events of a violent nature have been taking place, life for
the Cuban exile community has proceeded on a more prosaic but
ultimately more useful level. Twenty years is quite a long time
on this scale of events, time enough to put down firm roots in new soil
and time to be radically affected by the dramatically increased tempo
so well explained by Alvin Toffler in "Future Shock". This is no
longer a "refugee" community in the conventional sense; the United
States and the rest of the world have a much more pressing refugee
problem on their hands in 1979. The trauma of the old upheaval is
still painfully evident and many adjustments have yet to be made.
But both the United States and the Cubans themselves have become
substantially reconciled to the fact that this is their new, permanent,
home, and "this" means Dade County. By any standard, it is one of
the most extraordinary transplants of modern times. What all this
holds for the future is not a task to be examined here, but there are
already signs that it will be, so far as the problem of terrorism is
concerned, quite drastically different from the past. New
community leaders are emerging and these, though ever mindful of the
legacy of disillusionment and dispossession that these exiles cannot
yet shake off, are courageously engaging in what may be termed a
"politics of reconstruction". It is based less on consuming
hatred for a remote adversary from the past than on a real desire to
capitalize upon this community's tremendous potential for the
future. It recognizes the historical facts and makes no apologies
for them; but it is not weighed down by them either. This is a
community that had become genuinely concerned about its own potential
for self-destruction. It had seen the possibility of internecine
violence in its midst and wanted no part of it. It had become
concerned even about taking the traditionally "patriotic" view of
supporting violence abroad, while condemning it in the United
States. The events of 1976 had clearly shown that the distinction
could not always be so neatly made. The community had made great
material progress, beyond the wildest dreams of some. They had
shared, and shared fairly in what were mainly "good" years for those
who lived in the United States. Most would have had to think very
carefully before opting for a return to Cuba, on the assumption that
their homeland had been recovered and scoured forever of communist
influence. Further progress, materially and spiritually depended
to a large extent upon a quiet acceptance of matters as they are.
And this, naturally, forces an unpleasant but necessary recognition of
Castro and all he stands for an has come to symbolize for the exiled
population. This is a very hard thing indeed to do, but it is not
unique. The same choice faces the Arabs with regard to the
existence of the State of Israel. The "fanatics" among the Cuban
exiles may very appropriately be compared with those in Islam who
cannot and will not ever accept the consequences of the stroke of
history that brought the State of Israel. The "fanatics" among
the Cuban exiles may very appropriately be compared with those in Islam
who cannot and will not ever accept the consequences of the stroke of
history that brought the State of Israel into existence. Others
have shown themselves more malleable and although risking their
political positions and perhaps eve ntheir very lives, have decided
upon an accommodation with their adversaries that they hope will
redound to their own greater advantage. Such choices are never
easily made. They are even more difficult to translate into terms
of practical politics. They are a fertile breeding ground for
terrorism. Nevertheless, the Cuban exile community towards the
end of 1978 made that choice, with all the consequences, good and bad,
that it entails.
The present situation has been a long time in the making. With
hindsight, it serves to explain some of the events of earlier times and
to rationalize some of the violence of 1976 in terms of a brittleness
designed to resist the inevitable. Indeed, what occurred in 1977
may have been, at least in part, a reaction to the violence of
1976. On September 1, 1977 the United States and Cuba established
"Interest Sections" in Washington and Havana, marking a renovation of
direct, diplomatic contact between the two countries for the first time
in sixteen years. Meanwhile, unadvertized talks were proceeding
between some influential members of the Cuban exile community and the
Castro government. The principal topics of discussion were the
release of political prisoners held by the Castro regime and the
re-unification of families. A group of young exiles of the
Antonio Maceo Brigade visited Cuba in that same year to work as
volunteers, talk with Cuban officials, and see relatives. At a
news conference on September 6, 1978, Castro made a dramatic offer,
inviting members of the "Cuban community abroad" to "A Dialogue" aimed
at setting the stage for a comprehensive program of freeing the
political prisoner, reunifying families, and allowing exiles to return
as visitors to the island. This conciliatory gesture by Castro
was regarded with the greatest of suspicion by even the most interested
members of the community, but the benefits and hopes it held out were
too great to be resisted save by the most intractable. The "two
Cubans" thus began the process of dialogue which, while not leading to
a political reconciliation as such, was to change completely the
premises upon which the exile community had based much of its
existence. The changes were rapidly translated into practical
action. In the first three months of 1979, nearly 22,000 exiles
had traveled to Cuba, and it was confidently expected that more than
100,000 would do so before the year's end. The effect this has
had on the community as a whole is profound. This has been a time
of confusion and agonizing choices for the "Cuban community
abroad". The Miami Herald in an evocative article on the subject
published April 8, 1979, described the situation as giving rise to a
choice between "Blood and Politics". It is, perhaps, rather the
fashioning of a new kind of politics. A clear majority, judged by
its conduct, is in favor of the change, of some sort of dignified
rapprochement that will allow the two communities to live their
separate fashions but yet remained united by the ties of blood rather
than bitterly divided by the dictates of politics. Yet others
remain unreconciled to the changes that twenty years of history have
wrought and are, if anything, further hardened in their resolve to
fight in to the bitter end. There is a certain Latin pride
involved here that can make no concession to the victor; indeed, it
will not even concede him his victory. This spirit is expressed
in a letter published in U.S. News and World Report, May 28, 1979, and
is worth pondering in the present context:
"Exiles insult the dead, the incarcerated, every tragic victim of the
Caribbean satrap when they visit Castro's Cuba for any purpose other
than to help overthrow the abominable regime. Confiscation of
private property, end to freedom of assembly and of the press,
government by ukase, church worship a treasonable act, debased living
standards - this and more has been Castro's Cuba. Self-respecting
Cubans can never condone it or reconcile with this political, social
and economic wasteland of tyranny and poverty."
The principal vehicle through which this attempted accommodation with
Castro is being approached is a loose coalition of interests that has
titled itself The Committee of 75. This group of community
representatives has a dangerous and daunting task before it.
Again the comparison with President Sadat of Egypt invites
itself. A sudden, bold initiative has challenged fundamental
assumptions and has polarized opposition. The Committee of 75 has
twenty years of hatred and suspicion to overcome and it has but a
fragile constituency to which to appeal. Like President Sadat, it
will be judged by results. In a community that has traditionally
given little credit for altruism and has seen enough political
speculation in the past to make it truly cynical, it may be difficult
to live up to expectations of the kind raised. But for those who
have chosen to be a part of this endeavor, there is now only the road
forward, for there can be no turning back. A high price has
already been exacted for the progress made. A member of the
Committee, Carlos Muniz, aged 26, a member of the Antonio Maceo
Brigade, a tour operator in Puerto Rico promoting visits to Cuba was
murdered in San Juan on April 28, 1979. The precise connection
between the death of this young man and the intricate politics of the
moment is far from clear, but it is really unimportant for the present
purposes. What is significant are the interpretations being given
to his demise, the speculation surrounding its implications for the
safety of others, and the impact of all this on the community. It
would be premature to jump to conclusions regarding this matter or even
positively to assign political motives to this killing. The
experience of the past suggests that it is all too easy to forge links
that are stronger than the best available evidence can bear. One
is tempted to enquire why, if this indeed was an attack upon the
Committee of 75 through this member of it, a more prominent member of
it was not chosen for the purpose and why the killing was not carried
out in Miami where, one would have supposed, it might have had the most
fearful effect upon the community. Most certainly other members
of the Committee have been harassed and threatened both before and
after the death of Muniz, but, so far, none has been physically
attacked. This cannot be on account of the protection these
people are assumed to enjoy, for few have bodyguards and their overall
security is not such as to give them adequate protection against the
type of attacks that have taken place in the past. These
observations should not be taken as detracting in any way from the very
real assessment of danger that each of these individuals must face as a
result of his or her participation in the work of this Committee.
All must have been aware of this when they took upon themselves,
voluntarily, these obligations for the community as a whole. But
a hysterical, over reactive approach is unlikely to be of much
protective value. Just such an approach is that taken by The
Miami Herald Editorial of May 5, 1979, under the title "Terrorism Among
Cubans Calls for Immediate Action". The florid language of that
article can hardly have contributed to lowering the tensions existing
in a polarized community and can only be calculated to increase
whatever apprehensions are currently felt. It is, of course, an
undisguised appeal for federal assistance and, in so far as this might
be appropriate to the case, the appeal is only to be welcomed. It
will be interesting to see if it is sustained if it is carried to its
logical conclusion. It is material to cite in full one portion of
the Editorial having a bearing on this : "Only Federal authorities have
the resources fully to combat terrorism linked to Cuban politics.
The conspiracies involved, if any, almost certainly are both interstate
and international. Suspects and witnesses are scattered over
thousands of miles. Local authorities can only help; they cannot
solve the problem". This language, from a different standpoint,
is strikingly like that contained in the Lyons testimony to which
reference has been made. The real issue involves the ability to
obtain and utilize information; it is not a narrow jurisdictional
one. Would the Herald and other concerned media interests support
such a needed move to expand the law enforcement intelligence
system? This is a public relations matter which needs to be
carefully addressed.
Good cases are spoiled by latent or patent exaggeration. Some
statements take on an overpowering flavor from the context in which
they are set. The same editorial dealing with "Terrorism" reports
that "Federal and local law enforcement authorities investigated more
than 100 bombings and six political murders in South Florida between
1973 and 1976." The inference is surely that all this constituted
unassailable evidence for a "wave of politically inspired terrorism"
that "must not be permitted to return". While all would agree
that everything must be done to keep the community free from violence
of any sort, such uncritical statements are unpersuasive and unhelpful
to the case. When these bombings are considered on a case by case
basis, many are seen to be the result of private matters, some were
done for self-advertisement and others had criminal extortion as t heir
purpose. It is not necessary to examine here, in detail, each of
the six "political" murders to which reference is made, but most if not
all can only be regarded as such in the sense that the victim had at
some time or another been engaged in politics. Certainly few if
any of these individuals to whom allusion is made were killed because
of their politics. It is far from clear what enhanced federal
involvement is being sought here. Unless there is evidence of a
violation of a federal criminal statute, it would be grossly improper
for state and local law enforcement to be superseded. It is just
such a supersession that the Herald Editorial seems to call for and it
does great disservice to the proper law enforcement authorities having
jurisdiction over the matter and raises unwarranted expectations in the
larger readership that cannot be expected to appreciate these
niceties. It cannot help abate the understandable concerns of the
community or to lower the climate of terrorism by weakening public
confidence in the capabilities of its law enforcement system.
Since that controversial Editorial was published, much of its substance
has already taken on a moot quality. The matter has simply been
overtaken by events of a much grimmer kind than those presaged by the
writer of the Editorial. Dade County has been struck by an
unparallel wave of non-politically inspired violence beside which
anything done by militant Cuban exiles in their hey-day pales into
insignificance. Recent though these events are, they still belong
to history, but they represent the "tail" of the immediate future; the
beast is but a little way ahead. How much of this violence can be
properly described as terrorism must await a more leisurely examination
of the evidence. A pattern is certainly forming already, and what
is known gives cause for the greatest public concern. Politically
inspired terrorists operating in the Cuban exile community were, in the
main, very careful not to alienate their "constituency". They did
not engage in indiscriminate or even incautious killing; their victims
were carefully chosen and dispatched with a minimum of danger or even
inconvenience to the general public. The message of fear was
clearly written, but it was carefully addressed and was not specially
broadcast throughout the community. There was much boasting, much
ugly rhetoric, but the average Cuban resident of Dade County had little
to fear from even the most rabid militant, in the sense of some direct
assault upon his person or property. Politically inspired
terrorism reaps relatively high dividends in terms of the fear quotient
for the expenditure of comparatively little real effort. The
current drug-related violence carries with it a high degree of
involuntary involvement for the citizen at large. The killings
that took place in Dadeland Mall in July, 1979 were reckless in the
extreme; anyone who had the misfortune to be in the vicinity at the
time of the action was quite likely to have been targeted. Once
started, these "wars" are exceedingly difficult to stop. The
words of the Editorial of May 5 can be nicely adapted with but little
variation to the present situation; only they are even more apposite
when so amended. There it was said: "The danger, as this
community learned to its sorrow in 1975, is that a wave of politically
inspired terrorism, once unleashed, takes on a momentum of its
own." The only recommended addition to make that observation
germane to the present situation is the word "non" before
"politically-inspired". A full history of this wave of violence
will make interesting professional reading. It will certainly be
most productive of knowledge concerning non-political terrorism and its
impact on a community such as that of Dade County. What is highly
significant is the new dimension that has been added to the terrorism
picture by the incursion of "outsiders", violence-prone individuals who
are not a part of the now-stable resident Hispanic community.
All history, like cartography, is a compromise. It is largely a
matter of perspective how it is reported and what is made, by way of
exposition and commentary, of those reports. Some things are
drawn larger than life, while others appear unduly small. Much
depends on the historian's purpose. Here the objective has been
to provide a tool by which the dimensions of the problem might be
usefully examined. It is material to enquire as to what was, in
the past, called terrorism by law enforcement, by the media, by the
public. How serious a problem, in retrospect, was this?
What might have been done to alter the course of history, to reduce the
impact of this on the life of the community? A review of history
allows for such speculation, a sort of "Monday morning
quarter-backing"; "those who do not learn the lessons of the past are
compelled to repeat them in the future." There are many such
lessons to be drawn upon for the purposes of the present study.
Firstly, there is the danger of taking the narrow view; those who are
in the trenches generally see very little of the battle. It is
understandable that those actually involved in the action should see a
larger and less meaningful portion of the canvas than those who are
able to stand back and take a more expansive view. The historical
perspective offers useful correction to the narrow view formed at the
time. It is useful to recall that while Miami was suffering from
the politically inspired violence of 1975, that is now so vividly
recalled by some, that it was not alone in these matters. On
October 27, 1975, ten bombings were carried out by the FALN in an
attempt to gain attention for Puerto Rican independence and the release
of Puerto Rican "political prisoners". On October 31,v 1975, the
very day Rolando Masferrer Rojas was assassinated in Miami, the New
World Liberation Front was blowing up a storage building in California
in support of Puerto Rican independence, while the Emilio Zapata Unit
was bombing a Safeway store not far away. It is little comfort to
the inhabitants of Dade County to know that others are suffering the
same problems, though for different reasons, elsewhere. But it is
very necessary for those organizing and directing the response to keep
the wider picture in mind. In the struggle against terrorism it
is always to avoid overaction. To overreact emotionally and
materially is to play into the terrorists' hands. The first
serves only to alarm the community and to heighten the level of fear,
thus doing the terrorist's job for him. The second is simply
wasteful and the mistake has been repeated over and over again.
Whole armies have been tied down by a handful of terrorists. The
indiscriminate use of manpower and material does little to curb the
problem and may, on occasion be positively dangerous; the Howard
Johnson incident which took place in New Orleans on January 7, 1973, in
a case in point. General Grivas pointed out that you do not hunt
field mice with tanks; a cat will do the job much better. A needs
assessment study must be primarily concerned with findings the right
kind of cat for the job and training it to do its work well. The
lessons of history, if well learned, can serve as useful orientation
for the future.
An overview of past terrorism by types - A summary
Politically inspired terrorism
This has been, until recently, by far the commonest kind of terrorism
occurring in Dade County. It has been almost exclusively Cuban in
origin and related to matters of interest to the Cuban community in
exile. Quantitatively, bombing has predominated, but there have
been political killings and widespread extortion to finance these
militant movements. Kidnaping and hostage-taking have not been
featured activities in Dade County. Some skyjacking out of Miami
took place during the period when this crime was more prevalent, and
although Cuba was a destination, political motivation so far as it
related to the Cuban exile struggle was not in point.
Discriminating analysis of violent events involving the Cuban exile
population in Dade County shows the number that can be positively
assigned to this category to be much smaller than is the case
impressionistically.
Non-politically inspired terrorism
This has not constituted a significant problem in Dade County until
comparatively recently. The "old" organized crime interests,
concerned mainly with gambling, money-lending and vice settled their
disputes in an orderly way. Their impact on the community at
large was of an insidious but non-threatening character. Such
"terrorism" as existed was largely an internal matter. The
narcotics trade has radically changed this picture and the fact that
this, in Dade County, is now largely in Hispanic hands has disturbed
the overall position considerably. A power struggle is proceeding
for control of the drug traffic engaged in form this area and this is
giving rise to a great deal of violence, some of it of a terroristic
nature. An exact appreciation of its kind and quantity cannot
usefully made at this time, but it is safe to opine that it currently
presents a more serious problem for the community than does its
politically inspired counterpart.
International or transnational terrorism
Some of the politically inspired terrorism protagonized by the Cuban
exile groups has had this character. Operations have been planned
and prepared elsewhere and executed in Dade County. There have
been links and movements that have substantially passed beyond the
jurisdictional, if not the investigative bounds of local law
enforcement authorities. There have, so far, not been activities
of an overt nature by other international, politically inspired
terrorists in the Dade County area. No information has revealed
planning or preparatory action by any Palestinian group, Iranians,
Puerto Ricans, or any of the many active Left Wing Latin American
groups. The recent, non-politically inspired terrorism has
been of a transnational type involving mainly Columbians.
Domestic terrorism
This, again, has been almost exclusively related to internal struggles
within the Cuban exile community or in protest against United States'
policies with regard to Cuba. Most of the terrorist bombings that
have taken place in Dade County can be so classified. The
bombings by Rolando Otero Hernandez in March/April, 1975, are typical
examples of what might be assigned to this category. No black or
white-anglo groups have been active in Dade County for many
years. It should be recalled, in an historical context that
although El Poder Cubano was organized and operated out of Dade County,
its domestic terrorist activities especially during 1968, were
nationwide. On July 19 of that year, it was responsible for three
bombings in Los Angeles, for another on August 3 in New York City, and
yet another in Miami on August 17.
High technology terrorism
There has been no evidence of anything that could be so characterized
in the Dade-Miami area. This is not particularly surprising, as
there has been, as yet, very little manifestation of such developments.
Most of the terrorism taking place in Dade County or associated with it
in any way has been, technologically speaking, of a comparatively low
order. This is not due to any backwardness or lack of knowledge
in the community. The potential is clearly there, for the
Letelier bombing was indicative of considerable skill. It is also
interesting to note that Florida Power and Light employs an unusually
large number of Cuban engineers. While there have been no threats
involving this type of terrorism in Dade County, it is worth recalling
that on October 27, 1970, in Orlando, Florida, a 14 year old science
student demanded $1,000,000 and a safe conduct or he would explode a
hydrogen bomb, of which he submitted a credible diagram.
Quasi terrorism
There has been a lower incident of this type of criminality in
Dade-Miami than in many other comparable population centers
elsewhere. Quite strikingly, there have been very few
hostage-taking incidents and this seems to have followed the pattern
established by politically inspired terrorists. The Dade County
Public Safety Department, the City of Miami Police Department, and the
City of Miami Beach Police Department all have excellently trained SWAT
teams that have had very little employment in this regard during the
last few years.
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